Biblio

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) play a vital role in the development of smart cities. They enable various road safety and efficiency applications such as optimized traffic management, collision avoidance, and pollution control through the collection and evaluation of traffic data from Road Side Units (RSUs) and connected vehicles in real time. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to data corruption attacks which can seriously influence their decision-making abilities. Traditional attack detection schemes do not account for attackers' sophisticated and evolving strategies and ignore the ITS's constraints on security resources. In this paper, we devise a security game model that allows the defense mechanism deployed in the ITS to optimize the distribution of available resources for attack detection while considering mixed attack strategies, according to which the attacker targets multiple RSUs in a distributed fashion. In our security game, the utility of the ITS is quantified in terms of detection rate, attack damage, and the relevance of the information transmitted by the RSUs. The proposed approach will enable the ITS to mitigate the impact of attacks and increase its resiliency. The results show that our approach reduces the attack impact by at least 20% compared to the one that fairly allocates security resources to RSUs indifferently to attackers' strategies.

Game theory can provide a useful tool to study the security problem in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Most of existing works on applying game theories to security only consider two players in the security game model: an attacker and a defender. While this assumption may be valid for a network with centralized administration, it is not realistic in MANETs, where centralized administration is not available. In this paper, using recent advances in mean field game theory, we propose a novel game theoretic approach with multiple players for security in MANETs. The mean field game theory provides a powerful mathematical tool for problems with a large number of players. The proposed scheme can enable an individual node in MANETs to make strategic security defence decisions without centralized administration. In addition, since security defence mechanisms consume precious system resources (e.g., energy), the proposed scheme considers not only the security requirement of MANETs but also the system resources. Moreover, each node in the proposed scheme only needs to know its own state information and the aggregate effect of the other nodes in the MANET. Therefore, the proposed scheme is a fully distributed scheme. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.