Biblio

With the rapidly increasing connectivity in cyberspace, Insider Threat is becoming a huge concern. Insider threat detection from system logs poses a tremendous challenge for human analysts. Analyzing log files of an organization is a key component of an insider threat detection and mitigation program. Emerging machine learning approaches show tremendous potential for performing complex and challenging data analysis tasks that would benefit the next generation of insider threat detection systems. However, with huge sets of heterogeneous data to analyze, applying machine learning techniques effectively and efficiently to such a complex problem is not straightforward. In this paper, we extract a concise set of features from the system logs while trying to prevent loss of meaningful information and providing accurate and actionable intelligence. We investigate two unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms for insider threat detection and draw a comparison between different structures of the system logs including daily dataset and periodically aggregated one. We use the generated anomaly score from the previous cycle as the trust score of each user fed to the next period's model and show its importance and impact in detecting insiders. Furthermore, we consider the psychometric score of users in our model and check its effectiveness in predicting insiders. As far as we know, our model is the first one to take the psychometric score of users into consideration for insider threat detection. Finally, we evaluate our proposed approach on CERT insider threat dataset (v4.2) and show how it outperforms previous approaches.

Insider threat is a significant security risk for information system, and detection of insider threat is a major concern for information system organizers. Recently existing work mainly focused on the single pattern analysis of user single-domain behavior, which were not suitable for user behavior pattern analysis in multi-domain scenarios. However, the fusion of multi-domain irrelevant features may hide the existence of anomalies. Previous feature learning methods have relatively a large proportion of information loss in feature extraction. Therefore, this paper proposes a hybrid model based on the deep belief network (DBN) to detect insider threat. First, an unsupervised DBN is used to extract hidden features from the multi-domain feature extracted by the audit logs. Secondly, a One-Class SVM (OCSVM) is trained from the features learned by the DBN. The experimental results on the CERT dataset demonstrate that the DBN can be used to identify the insider threat events and it provides a new idea to feature processing for the insider threat detection.

Due to design and fabrication outsourcing to foundries, the problem of malicious modifications to integrated circuits known as hardware Trojans has attracted attention in academia as well as industry. To reduce the risks associated with Trojans, researchers have proposed different approaches to detect them. Among these approaches, test-time detection approaches have drawn the greatest attention and most approaches assume the existence of a “golden model”. Prior works suggest using reverse-engineering to identify such Trojan-free ICs for the golden model but they did not state how to do this efficiently. In this paper, we propose an innovative and robust reverseengineering approach to identify the Trojan-free ICs. We adapt a well-studied machine learning method, one-class support vector machine, to solve our problem. Simulation results using state-of-the-art tools on several publicly available circuits show that our approach can detect hardware Trojans with high accuracy rate across different modeling and algorithm parameters.