Biblio

As a rich source of data, Call Graphs are used for various applications including security vulnerability detection. Despite multiple studies showing that Call Graphs can drastically improve the accuracy of analysis, existing ecosystem-scale tools like Dependabot do not use Call Graphs and work at the package-level. Using Call Graphs in ecosystem use cases is not practical because of the scalability problems that Call Graph generators have. Call Graph generation is usually considered to be a "full program analysis" resulting in large Call Graphs and expensive computation. To make an analysis applicable to ecosystem scale, this pragmatic approach does not work, because the number of possible combinations of how a particular artifact can be combined in a full program explodes. Therefore, it is necessary to make the analysis incremental. There are existing studies on different types of incremental program analysis. However, none of them focuses on Call Graph generation for an entire ecosystem. In this paper, we propose an incremental implementation of the CHA algorithm that can generate Call Graphs on-demand, by stitching together partial Call Graphs that have been extracted for libraries before. Our preliminary evaluation results show that the proposed approach scales well and outperforms the most scalable existing framework called OPAL.

This paper examines security faults/vulnerabilities reported for Fedora. Results indicate that, at least in some situations, fault roughly constant may be used to guide estimation of residual vulnerabilities in an already released product, as well as possibly guide testing of the next version of the product.

In highly configurable systems the configuration space is too big for (re-)certifying every configuration in isolation. In this project, we combine software analysis with network analysis to detect which configuration options interact and which have local effects. Instead of analyzing a system as Linux and SELinux for every combination of configuration settings one by one (>102000 even considering compile-time configurations only), we analyze the effect of each configuration option once for the entire configuration space. The analysis will guide us to designs separating interacting configuration options in a core system and isolating orthogonal and less trusted configuration options from this core.

Security features are often hardwired into software applications, making it difficult to adapt security responses to reflect changes in runtime context and new attacks. In prior work, we proposed the idea of architecture-based self-protection as a way of separating adaptation logic from application logic and providing a global perspective for reasoning about security adaptations in the context of other business goals. In this paper, we present an approach, based on this idea, for combating denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Our approach allows DoS-related tactics to be composed into more sophisticated mitigation strategies that encapsulate possible responses to a security problem. Then, utility-based reasoning can be used to consider different business contexts and qualities. We describe how this approach forms the underpinnings of a scientific approach to self-protection, allowing us to reason about how to make the best choice of mitigation at runtime. Moreover, we also show how formal analysis can be used to determine whether the mitigations cover the range of conditions the system is likely to encounter, and the effect of mitigations on other quality attributes of the system. We evaluate the approach using the Rainbow self-adaptive framework and show how Rainbow chooses DoS mitigation tactics that are sensitive to different business contexts.