An Analysis of Fedora Security Profile
Title | An Analysis of Fedora Security Profile |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2014 |
Authors | Subramani, Shweta, Vouk, Mladen, Williams, Laurie |
Conference Name | Proceedings of the 2014 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security |
Publisher | ACM |
Conference Location | Raleigh, NC, USA |
ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-2907-1 |
Keywords | ACM CCS, cyber security, detection, Domain-Specific Security and Privacy Architectures, Fedora, Formal Methods and Theory of Security, Foundations, Logic and Verification, non-operational testing, prediction, science of security, security faults, Software and Application Security, Testing, Validation and Verification, vulnerabilities |
Abstract | This paper examines security faults/vulnerabilities reported for Fedora. Results indicate that, at least in some situations, fault roughly constant may be used to guide estimation of residual vulnerabilities in an already released product, as well as possibly guide testing of the next version of the product. |
URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2600176.2600211 |
DOI | 10.1145/2600176.2600211 |
Citation Key | Subramani:2014:AFS:2600176.2600211 |
- Testing
- Science of Security
- Validation and Verification
- Foundations
- ACM CCS
- cyber security
- detection
- Domain-Specific Security and Privacy Architectures
- Fedora
- Formal Methods and Theory of Security
- foundations
- Logic and Verification
- Non-Operational Testing
- prediction
- Science of Security
- security faults
- Software and Application Security
- testing
- validation and verification
- vulnerabilities
- ACM CCS
- Domain-Specific Security and Privacy Architectures
- Cyber Security
- Formal Methods and Theory of Security
- Logic and Verification
- Software and Application Security