| Title | One-Message Unilateral Entity Authentication Schemes |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2017 |
| Authors | De Santis, Alfredo, Flores, Manuela, Masucci, Barbara |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-5257-4 |
| Keywords | Authentication schemes, composability, compositionality, Metrics, one-time password, provable security, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency |
| Abstract | A one-message unilateral entity authentication scheme allows one party, called the prover, to authenticate himself, i.e., to prove his identity, to another party, called the verifier, by sending a single authentication message. In this paper we consider schemes where the prover and the verifier do not share any secret information, such as a password, in advance. We propose the first theoretical characterization for one-message unilateral entity authentication schemes, by formalizing the security requirements for such schemes with respect to different kinds of adversaries. Afterwards, we propose three provably-secure constructions for one-message unilateral entity authentication schemes. |
| DOI | 10.1145/3098954.3098982 |
| Citation Key | de_santis_one-message_2017 |
One-Message Unilateral Entity Authentication Schemes