Trusted CPS from Untrusted Components

The nation's critical infrastructures are increasingly dependent on systems that use computers to control vital physical components. Imagine if you lose electric power, your water stops flowing, airplanes stop flying, medical devices stop working, and chemical plants explode. These are all examples of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) that are vulnerable to attack through their computer systems, through their physical properties such as power flow, water flow, chemistry, etc., or through both. The potential consequences of such compromised systems include financial disaster, civil disorder, even the loss of life. The proposed work significantly advances the science of protecting CPSs by ensuring that the systems "do what they are supposed to do" despite an attacker trying to make them fail or do harm. In this convergent approach, the key is to tell the CPS how it is supposed to behave and build in defenses that make sure each component behaves and works well with others. The proposed work has a clear transition to industrial practice. It will also enhance education and opportunity by opening up securing society as a fascinating discipline for K-12 students to follow.