Cryptography

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Visible to the public Cryptol version 2: An Open Source Cryptol

Submitted by brad_martin on Sat, 04/26/2014 - 7:08am. Contributor:

Abstract

HCSS participants, in the main, know about Galois' Cryptol language and system and its capabilities. In short, Cryptol is a domain-specific language for programming, executing, testing, and formally reasoning about streams of bits. Cryptol particularly excels at specifying and reasoning about cryptographic algorithms.

Galois has decided to "reboot" Cryptol and create, from the ground up, a new Open Source Cryptol release: Cryptol version 2.

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Visible to the public PhD Position in Information Security at Chalmers University of Technology

Submitted by Anonymous on Fri, 08/02/2013 - 10:49am

1 PhD position in Information Security at the Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden

Application deadline: August 31, 2013

Job Description

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Visible to the public Techniques for Scalable Symbolic Simulation

Submitted by TimTh on Mon, 05/13/2013 - 4:00pm. Contributor:

Presented as part of the 2013 HCSS conference.

ABSTRACT

Symbolic simulation is a powerful technique for building mathematical models describing a program's results by simulating execution while interpreting inputs as symbolic variables. Such models can then be used to prove properties about the corresponding source program, including equivalence against a reference implementation.

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Visible to the public Efficiently Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Submitted by Katie Dey on Tue, 12/11/2012 - 8:44pm. Contributor:

Large-scale data management systems rely more and more on cloud storage, where the need for efficient search capabilities clashes with the need for data privacy. Searchable encryption is a tool for supporting queries to en- crypted databases which provides various levels of efficiency, functionality, and security.

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Visible to the public On the (Im)Possibility of Tamper-Resilient Cryptography

Submitted by Katie Dey on Sun, 10/21/2012 - 6:27pm

ABSTRACT

We initiate a study of the security of cryptographic primitives in the presence of efficient tampering attacks to the randomness of honest parties. More precisely, we consider p-tampering attackers that may tamper with each bit of the honest parties' random tape with probability p, but have to do so

in an "online" fashion. We present both positive and negative results: