Biblio

Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network trac. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for sel sh and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.

The use of a shared medium leaves wireless networks, including mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, vulnerable to jamming attacks. In this paper, we introduce a jamming defense mechanism for multiple-path routing networks based on maintaining deceptive flows, consisting of fake packets, between a source and a destination. An adversary observing a deceptive flow will expend energy on disrupting the fake packets, allowing the real data packets to arrive at the destination unharmed. We model this deceptive flow-based defense within a multi-stage stochastic game framework between the network nodes, which choose a routing path and flow rates for the real and fake data, and an adversary, which chooses which fraction of each flow to target at each hop. We develop an efficient, distributed procedure for computing the optimal routing at each hop and the optimal flow allocation at the destination. Furthermore, by studying the equilibria of the game, we quantify the benefit arising from deception, as reflected in an increase in the valid throughput. Our results are demonstrated via a simulation study.

Performance of routing is severely degraded when misbehaving nodes drop packets instead of properly forwarding them. In this paper, we propose a Game-Theoretic Adaptive Multipath Routing (GTAMR) protocol to detect and punish selfish or malicious nodes which try to drop information packets in routing phase and defend against collaborative attacks in which nodes try to disrupt communication or save their power. Our proposed algorithm outranks previous schemes because it is resilient against attacks in which more than one node coordinate their misbehavior and can be used in networks which wireless nodes use directional antennas. We then propose a game theoretic strategy, ERTFT, for nodes to promote cooperation. In comparison with other proposed TFT-like strategies, ours is resilient to systematic errors in detection of selfish nodes and does not lead to unending death spirals.

The question of whether strategic deterrence in cyberspace is achievable given the challenges of detection, attribution and credible retaliation is a topic of contention among military and civilian defense strategists. This paper examines the traditional strategic deterrence theory and its application to deterrence in cyberspace (the newly defined 5th battlespace domain, following land, air, sea and space domains), which is being used increasingly by nation-states and their proxies to achieve information dominance and to gain tactical and strategic economic and military advantage. It presents a taxonomy of cyberattacks that identifies which types of threats in the confidentiality, integrity, availability cybersecurity model triad present the greatest risk to nation-state economic and military security, including their political and social facets. The argument is presented that attacks on confidentiality cannot be subject to deterrence in the current international legal framework and that the focus of strategy needs to be applied to integrity and availability attacks. A potential cyberdeterrence strategy is put forth that can enhance national security against devastating cyberattacks through a credible declaratory retaliation capability that establishes red lines which may trigger a counter-strike against all identifiable responsible parties. The author believes such strategy can credibly influence nation-state threat actors who themselves exhibit serious vulnerabilities to cyber attacks from launching a devastating cyber first strike.

Information Technology (IT) security is a growing concern for governments around the world. Cyber terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the nations' critical infrastructures and ITs as a low-cost asymmetric warfare element. Most of these nations are aware of the vulnerability of the information technologies and the significance of protecting critical infrastructures. To counteract the threat of potentially disastrous cyber attacks, nations' policy makers are increasingly pondering on the use of deterrence strategies to supplement cyber defense. Nations create their own national policies and strategies which cover cyber security countermeasures including cyber defense and deterrence against cyber threats. But it is rather hard to cope with the threat by means of merely `national' cyber defense policies and strategies, since the cyberspace spans worldwide and attack's origin can even be overseas. The term “cyber terrorism” is another source of controversy. An agreement on a common definition of cyber terrorism among the nations is needed. However, the international community has not been able to succeed in developing a commonly accepted comprehensive definition of “terrorism” itself. This paper evaluates the importance of building international cooperation on cyber defense and deterrence against cyber terrorism. It aims to improve and further existing contents and definitions of cyber terrorism; discusses the attractiveness of cyber attacks for terrorists and past experiences on cyber terrorism. It emphasizes establishing international legal measures and cooperation between nations against cyber terrorism in order to maintain the international stability and prosperity. In accordance with NATO's new strategic concept, it focuses on developing the member nations' ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks to enhance and coordinate national cyber defense capabilities. It provides necessary steps that have to be taken globally in order to counter cyber terrorism.

Physical attacks against cryptographic devices typically take advantage of information leakage (e.g., side-channels attacks) or erroneous computations (e.g., fault injection attacks). Preventing or detecting these attacks has become a challenging task in modern cryptographic research. In this context intrinsic physical properties of integrated circuits, such as Physical(ly) Unclonable Functions (PUFs), can be used to complement classical cryptographic constructions, and to enhance the security of cryptographic devices. PUFs have recently been proposed for various applications, including anti-counterfeiting schemes, key generation algorithms, and in the design of block ciphers. However, currently only rudimentary security models for PUFs exist, limiting the confidence in the security claims of PUF-based security primitives. A useful model should at the same time (i) define the security properties of PUFs abstractly and naturally, allowing to design and formally analyze PUF-based security solutions, and (ii) provide practical quantification tools allowing engineers to evaluate PUF instantiations. In this paper, we present a formal foundation for security primitives based on PUFs. Our approach requires as little as possible from the physics and focuses more on the main properties at the heart of most published works on PUFs: robustness (generation of stable answers), unclonability (not provided by algorithmic solutions), and unpredictability. We first formally define these properties and then show that they can be achieved by previously introduced PUF instantiations. We stress that such a consolidating work allows for a meaningful security analysis of security primitives taking advantage of physical properties, becoming increasingly important in the development of the next generation secure information systems.

We introduce noncooperatively optimized tolerance (NOT), a game theoretic generalization of highly optimized tolerance (HOT), which we illustrate in the forest fire framework. As the number of players increases, NOT retains features of HOT, such as robustness and self-dissimilar landscapes, but also develops features of self-organized criticality. The system retains considerable robustness even as it becomes fractured, due in part to emergent cooperation between players, and at the same time exhibits increasing resilience against changes in the environment, giving rise to intermediate regimes where the system is robust to a particular distribution of adverse events, yet not very fragile to changes.

Dynamic taint analysis and forward symbolic execution are quickly becoming staple techniques in security analyses. Example applications of dynamic taint analysis and forward symbolic execution include malware analysis, input filter generation, test case generation, and vulnerability discovery. Despite the widespread usage of these two techniques, there has been little effort to formally define the algorithms and summarize the critical issues that arise when these techniques are used in typical security contexts. The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we precisely describe the algorithms for dynamic taint analysis and forward symbolic execution as extensions to the run-time semantics of a general language. Second, we highlight important implementation choices, common pitfalls, and considerations when using these techniques in a security context.

Contrary to widespread assumption, dynamic RAM (DRAM), the main memory in most modern computers, retains its contents for several seconds after power is lost, even at room temperature and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAM becomes less reliable when it is not refreshed, it is not immediately erased, and its contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access to a machine. It poses a particular threat to laptop users who rely on disk encryption: we demonstrate that it could be used to compromise several popular disk encryption products without the need for any special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory retention and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple cooling techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.

Motivated by the September 11 attacks, we are addressing the problem of policy analysis of supply-chain security. Considering the potential economic and operational impacts of inspection together with the inherent difficulty of assigning a reasonable cost to an inspection failure call for a policy analysis methodology in which stakeholders can understand the trade-offs between the diverse and potentially conflicting objectives. To obtain this information, we used a simulation-based methodology to characterize the set of Pareto optimal solutions with respect to the multiple objectives represented in the decision problem. Our methodology relies on simulation and the response surface method (RSM) to model the relationships between inspection policies and relevant stakeholder objectives in order to construct a set of Pareto optimal solutions. The approach is illustrated with an application to a real-world supply chain.