Biblio

Self-diagnosis is a fundamental capability of self-adaptive systems. In order to recover from faults, systems need to know which part is responsible for the incorrect behavior. In previous work we showed how to apply a design-time diagnosis technique at run time to identify faults at the architectural level of a system. Our contributions address three major shortcomings of our previous work: 1) we present an expressive, hierarchical language to describe system behavior that can be used to diagnose when a system is behaving different to expectation; the hierarchical language facilitates mapping low level system events to architecture level events; 2) we provide an automatic way to determine how much data to collect before an accurate diagnosis can be produced; and 3) we develop a technique that allows the detection of correlated faults between components. Our results are validated experimentally by injecting several failures in a system and accurately diagnosing them using our algorithm.

The Pi Calculus is a popular formalism for modeling distributed computation. Session Types extend the Pi Calculus with a static, inferable type system. Dependent Types allow for a more precise characterization of the behavior of programs, but in their full generality are not inferable. In this paper, we present LiquidPi an approach that combines the dependent type inferencing of Liquid Types with Honda’s Session Types to give a more precise automatically derived description of the behavior of distributed programs. These types can be used to describe/enforce safety properties of distributed systems. We present a type system parametric over an underlying functional language with Pi Calculus connectives and give an inference algorithm for it by means of efficient external solvers and a set of dependent qualifier templates.

Since conventional software security approaches are often manually developed and statically deployed, they are no longer sufficient against today's sophisticated and evolving cyber security threats. This has motivated the development of self-protecting software that is capable of detecting security threats and mitigating them through runtime adaptation techniques. In this paper, we argue for an architecture-based self- protection (ABSP) approach to address this challenge. In ABSP, detection and mitigation of security threats are informed by an architectural representation of the running system, maintained at runtime. With this approach, it is possible to reason about the impact of a potential security breach on the system, assess the overall security posture of the system, and achieve defense in depth. To illustrate the effectiveness of this approach, we present several architecture adaptation patterns that provide reusable detection and mitigation strategies against well-known web application security threats. Finally, we describe our ongoing work in realizing these patterns on top of Rainbow, an existing architecture-based adaptation framework.

Domain-specific languages improve ease-of-use, expressiveness and verifiability, but defining and using different DSLs within a single application remains difficult. We introduce an approach for embedded DSLs where 1) whitespace delimits DSL-governed blocks, and 2) the parsing and type checking phases occur in tandem so that the expected type of the block determines which domain-specific parser governs that block. We argue that this approach occupies a sweet spot, providing high expressiveness and ease-of-use while maintaining safe composability. We introduce the design, provide examples and describe an ongoing implementation of this strategy in the Wyvern programming language. We also discuss how a more conventional keyword-directed strategy for parsing of DSLs can arise as a special case of this type-directed strategy. 

The simplest and purest practical object-oriented language designs today are seen in dynamically-typed languages, such as Smalltalk and Self. Static types, however, have potential benefits for productivity, security, and reasoning about programs. In this paper, we describe the design of Wyvern, a statically typed, pure object-oriented language that attempts to retain much of the simplicity and expressiveness of these iconic designs.

Our goals lead us to combine pure object-oriented and functional abstractions in a simple, typed setting. We present a foundational object-based language that we believe to be as close as one can get to simple typed lambda calculus while keeping object-orientation. We show how this foundational language can be translated to the typed lambda calculus via standard encodings. We then define a simple extension to this language that introduces classes and show that classes are no more than sugar for the foundational object-based language. Our future intention is to demonstrate that modules and other object-oriented features can be added to our language as not more than such syntactical extensions while keeping the object-oriented core as pure as possible.

The design of Wyvern closely follows both historical and modern ideas about the essence of object-orientation, suggesting a new way to think about a minimal, practical, typed core language for objects.

In this report we show how to adapt the notion of “attack surface” to formally evaluate security properties at the architectural level of design and to identify vulnerabilities in architectural designs. Further we explore the application of this metric in the context of architecture-based transformations to improve security by reducing the attack surface. These transformations are described in detail and validated with a simple experiment.

In this paper, we introduce and experimentally validate a sampling-based planning algorithm for quasi-static manipulation of a planar elastic rod. Our algorithm is an immediate consequence of deriving a global coordinate chart of finite dimension that suffices to describe all possible configurations of the rod that can be placed in static equilibrium by fixing the position and orientation of each end. Hardware experiments confirm this derivation in the case where the “rod” is a thin, flexible strip of metal that has a fixed base and that is held at the other end by an industrial robot. We show an example in which a path of the robot that was planned by our algorithm causes the metal strip to move between given start and goal configurations while remaining in quasi-static equilibrium.

To date, work in evolvable and adaptive hardware (EAH) has been largely isolated from primary inclusion into larger design processes. Almost without exception, EAH efforts are aimed at creating systems whole cloth, creating drop-in replacements for existing components of a larger design, or creating after-the-fact fixes for designs found to be deficient. This paper will discuss early efforts in integrating EAH methods into the design of a controller for a flapping-wing micro air vehicle (FWMAV). The FWMAV project is extensive, multidisciplinary, and on going. Because EAH methods were in consideration during its earliest design stages, this project provides a rich environment in which to explore means of effectively combining EAH and traditional design methodologies. In addition to providing a concrete EAH design that addresses potential problems with FWMAV flight in a unique way, this paper will also provide a provisional list of EAH design integration principles, drawn from our experiences to date.

Most efforts to improve cyber security focus primarily on incorporating new technological approaches in products and processes. However, a key element of improvement involves acknowledging the importance of human behavior when designing, building and using cyber security technology. In this survey paper, we describe why incorporating an understanding of human behavior into cyber security products and processes can lead to more effective technology. We present two examples: the first demonstrates how leveraging behavioral science leads to clear improvements, and the other illustrates how behavioral science offers the potential for significant increases in the effectiveness of cyber security. Based on feedback collected from practitioners in preliminary interviews, we narrow our focus to two important behavioral aspects: cognitive load and bias. Next, we identify proven and potential behavioral science findings that have cyber security relevance, not only related to cognitive load and bias but also to heuristics and behavioral science models. We conclude by suggesting several next steps for incorporating behavioral science findings in our technological design, development and use.