Biblio
Many embedded systems have evolved from simple bare-metal control systems to highly complex network-connected systems. These systems increasingly demand rich and feature-full operating-systems (OS) functionalities. Furthermore, the network connectedness offers attack vectors that require stronger security designs. To that end, this paper defines a prototypical RTOS API called Patina that provides services common in featurerich OSes (e.g., Linux) but absent in more trustworthy μ -kernel based systems. Examples of such services include communication channels, timers, event management, and synchronization. Two Patina implementations are presented, one on Composite and the other on seL4, each of which is designed based on the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) to increase system security. This paper describes how each of these μ -kernels affect the PoLP based design, as well as discusses security and performance tradeoffs in the two implementations. Results of comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that the performance of the PoLP based implementation of Patina offers comparable or superior performance to Linux, while offering heightened isolation.
In a centralized Networked Control System (NCS), all agents share local data with a central processing unit that generates control commands for agents. The use of a communication network between the agents gives NCSs a distinct advantage in efficiency, design cost, and simplicity. However, this benefit comes at the expense of vulnerability to a range of cyber-physical attacks. Recently, novel defense mechanisms to counteract false data injection (FDI) attacks on NCSs have been developed for agents with linear dynamics but have not been thoroughly investigated for NCSs with nonlinear dynamics. This paper proposes an FDI attack mitigation strategy for NCSs composed of agents with nonlinear dynamics under disturbances and measurement noises. The proposed algorithm uses both learning and model-based approaches to estimate agents'states for FDI attack mitigation. A neural network is used to model uncertain dynamics and estimate the effect of FDI attacks. The controller and estimator are designed based on Lyapunov stability analysis. A simulation of robots with Euler-Lagrange dynamics is considered to demonstrate the developed controller's performance to respond to FDI attacks in real-time.
Modern enterprises increasingly take advantage of cloud infrastructures. Yet, outsourcing code and data into the cloud requires enterprises to trust cloud providers not to meddle with their data. To reduce the level of trust towards cloud providers, AMD has introduced Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). By encrypting Virtual Machines (VMs), SEV aims to ensure data confidentiality, despite a compromised or curious Hypervisor. The SEV Encrypted State (SEV-ES) extension additionally protects the VM’s register state from unauthorized access. Yet, both extensions do not provide integrity of the VM’s memory, which has already been abused to leak the protected data or to alter the VM’s control-flow. In this paper, we introduce the SEVerity attack; a missing puzzle piece in the series of attacks against the AMD SEV family. Specifically, we abuse the system’s lack of memory integrity protection to inject and execute arbitrary code within SEV-ES-protected VMs. Contrary to previous code execution attacks against the AMD SEV family, SEVerity neither relies on a specific CPU version nor on any code gadgets inside the VM. Instead, SEVerity abuses the fact that SEV-ES prohibits direct memory access into the encrypted memory. Specifically, SEVerity injects arbitrary code into the encrypted VM through I/O channels and uses the Hypervisor to locate and trigger the execution of the encrypted payload. This allows us to sidestep the protection mechanisms of SEV-ES. Overall, our results demonstrate a success rate of 100% and hence highlight that memory integrity protection is an obligation when encrypting VMs. Consequently, our work presents the final stroke in a series of attacks against AMD SEV and SEV-ES and renders the present implementation as incapable of protecting against a curious, vulnerable, or malicious Hypervisor.
Deep learning has made remarkable achievements in various domains. Active learning, which aims to reduce the budget for training a machine-learning model, is especially useful for the Deep learning tasks with the demand of a large number of labeled samples. Unfortunately, our empirical study finds that many of the active learning heuristics are not effective when applied to Deep learning models in batch settings. To tackle these limitations, we propose a density weighted diversity based query strategy (DWDS), which makes use of the geometry of the samples. Within a limited labeling budget, DWDS enhances model performance by querying labels for the new training samples with the maximum informativeness and representativeness. Furthermore, we propose a beam-search based method to obtain a good approximation to the optimum of such samples. Our experiments show that DWDS outperforms existing algorithms in Deep learning tasks.
Content blocking is an important part of a per-formant, user-serving, privacy respecting web. Current content blockers work by building trust labels over URLs. While useful, this approach has many well understood shortcomings. Attackers may avoid detection by changing URLs or domains, bundling unwanted code with benign code, or inlining code in pages.The common flaw in existing approaches is that they evaluate code based on its delivery mechanism, not its behavior. In this work we address this problem by building a system for generating signatures of the privacy-and-security relevant behavior of executed JavaScript. Our system uses as the unit of analysis each script's behavior during each turn on the JavaScript event loop. Focusing on event loop turns allows us to build highly identifying signatures for JavaScript code that are robust against code obfuscation, code bundling, URL modification, and other common evasions, as well as handle unique aspects of web applications.This work makes the following contributions to the problem of measuring and improving content blocking on the web: First, we design and implement a novel system to build per-event-loop-turn signatures of JavaScript behavior through deep instrumentation of the Blink and V8 runtimes. Second, we apply these signatures to measure how much privacy-and-security harming code is missed by current content blockers, by using EasyList and EasyPrivacy as ground truth and finding scripts that have the same privacy and security harming patterns. We build 1,995,444 signatures of privacy-and-security relevant behaviors from 11,212 unique scripts blocked by filter lists, and find 3,589 unique scripts hosting known harmful code, but missed by filter lists, affecting 12.48% of websites measured. Third, we provide a taxonomy of ways scripts avoid detection and quantify the occurrence of each. Finally, we present defenses against these evasions, in the form of filter list additions where possible, and through a proposed, signature based system in other cases.As part of this work, we share the implementation of our signature-generation system, the data gathered by applying that system to the Alexa 100K, and 586 AdBlock Plus compatible filter list rules to block instances of currently blocked code being moved to new URLs.
Security plays a major role in data transmission and reception. Providing high security is indispensable in communication systems. The RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) cryptosystem is used widely in cryptographic applications as it offers highly secured transmission. RSA cryptosystem uses Montgomery multipliers and it involves modular exponentiation process which is attained by performing repeated modular-multiplications. This leads to high latency and owing to improve the speed of multiplier, highly efficient modular multiplication methodology needs to be applied. In the conventional methodology, Carry Save Adder (CSA) is used in the multiplication and it consumes more area and it has larger delay, but in the suggested methodology, the Reverse Carry Propagate (RCP) adder is used in the place of CSA adder and the obtained output shows promising results in terms of area and latency. The simulation is done with Xilinx ISE design suite. The proposed multiplier can be used effectively in signal processing, image processing and security based applications.
With the continuous emergence of cyber attacks, the security of industrial control system (ICS) has become a hot issue in academia and industry. Intrusion detection technology plays an irreplaceable role in protecting industrial system from attacks. However, the imbalance between normal samples and attack samples seriously affects the performance of intrusion detection algorithms. This paper proposes SE-IDS, which uses generative adversarial networks (GAN) to expand the minority to make the number of normal samples and attack samples relatively balanced, adopts particle swarm optimization (PSO) to optimize the parameters of LightGBM. Finally, we evaluated the performance of the proposed model on the industrial network dataset.
Cyberattacks have been the major concern with the growing advancement in technology. Complex security models have been developed to combat these attacks, yet none exhibit a full-proof performance. Recently, several machine learning (ML) methods have gained significant popularity in offering effective and efficient intrusion detection schemes which assist in proactive detection of multiple network intrusions, such as Denial of Service (DoS), Probe, Remote to User (R2L), User to Root attack (U2R). Multiple research works have been surveyed based on adopted ML methods (either signature-based or anomaly detection) and some of the useful observations, performance analysis and comparative study are highlighted in this paper. Among the different ML algorithms in survey, PSO-SVM algorithm has shown maximum accuracy. Using RBF-based classifier and C-means clustering algorithm, a new model i.e., combination of serial and parallel IDS is proposed in this paper. The detection rate to detect known and unknown intrusion is 99.5% and false positive rate is 1.3%. In PIDS (known intrusion classifier), the detection rate for DOS, probe, U2R and R2L is 99.7%, 98.8%, 99.4% and 98.5% and the False positive rate is 0.6%, 0.2%, 3% and 2.8% respectively. In SIDS (unknown intrusion classifier), the rate of intrusion detection is 99.1% and false positive rate is 1.62%. This proposed model has known intrusion detection accuracy similar to PSO - SVM and is better than all other models. Finally the future research directions relevant to this domain and contributions have been discussed.