Visible to the public Lightweight Monitoring Scheme for Flooding DoS Attack Detection in Multi-Tenant MPSoCs

TitleLightweight Monitoring Scheme for Flooding DoS Attack Detection in Multi-Tenant MPSoCs
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2021
AuthorsChaves, Cesar G., Sepulveda, Johanna, Hollstein, Thomas
Conference Name2021 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS)
Date PublishedMay 2021
PublisherIEEE
ISBN Number978-1-7281-9201-7
Keywordscomposability, Floods, Integrated circuit modeling, Metrics, Monitoring, multiprocessing systems, network on chip security, network-on-chip, Payloads, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, Task Analysis
AbstractThe increasing use of Multiprocessor Systems-on-Chip (MPSoCs) within scalable multi-tenant systems, such as fog/cloud computing, faces the challenge of potential attacks originated by the execution of malicious tasks. Flooding Denial- of-Service (FDoS) attacks are one of the most common and powerful threats for Network-on-Chip (NoC)-based MPSoCs. Since, by overwhelming the NoC, the system is unable to forward legitimate traffic. However, the effectiveness of FDoS attacks depend on the NoC configuration. Moreover, designing a secure MPSoC capable of detecting such attacks while avoiding excessive power/energy and area costs is challenging. To this end, we present two contributions. First, we demonstrate two types of FDoS attacks: based on the packet injection rate (PIR-based FDoS) and based on the packet's payload length (PPL-based FDoS). We show that fair round-robin NoCs are intrinsically protected against PIR-based FDoS. Instead, PPL-based FDoS attacks represent a real threat to MPSoCs. Second, we propose a novel lightweight monitoring method for detecting communication disruptions. Simulation and synthesis results show the feasibility and efficiency of the presented approach.
URLhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9401153
DOI10.1109/ISCAS51556.2021.9401153
Citation Keychaves_lightweight_2021