Biblio

Filters: Author is Hong, Geng  [Clear All Filters]
2023-03-03
Hong, Geng, Yang, Zhemin, Yang, Sen, Liaoy, Xiaojing, Du, Xiaolin, Yang, Min, Duan, Haixin.  2022.  Analyzing Ground-Truth Data of Mobile Gambling Scams. 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). :2176–2193.
With the growth of mobile computing techniques, mobile gambling scams have seen a rampant increase in the recent past. In mobile gambling scams, miscreants deliver scamming messages via mobile instant messaging, host scam gambling platforms on mobile apps, and adopt mobile payment channels. To date, there is little quantitative knowledge about how this trending cybercrime operates, despite causing daily fraud losses estimated at more than \$\$\$522,262 USD. This paper presents the first empirical study based on ground-truth data of mobile gambling scams, associated with 1,461 scam incident reports and 1,487 gambling scam apps, spanning from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020. The qualitative and quantitative analysis of this ground-truth data allows us to characterize the operational pipeline and full fraud kill chain of mobile gambling scams. In particular, we study the social engineering tricks used by scammers and reveal their effectiveness. Our work provides a systematic analysis of 1,068 confirmed Android and 419 iOS scam apps, including their development frameworks, declared permissions, compatibility, and backend network infrastructure. Perhaps surprisingly, our study unveils that public online app generators have been abused to develop gambling scam apps. Our analysis reveals several payment channels (ab)used by gambling scam app and uncovers a new type of money mule-based payment channel with the average daily gambling deposit of \$\$\$400,000 USD. Our findings enable a better understanding of the mobile gambling scam ecosystem, and suggest potential avenues to disrupt these scam activities.
ISSN: 2375-1207
2018-11-19
Hong, Geng, Yang, Zhemin, Yang, Sen, Zhang, Lei, Nan, Yuhong, Zhang, Zhibo, Yang, Min, Zhang, Yuan, Qian, Zhiyun, Duan, Haixin.  2018.  How You Get Shot in the Back: A Systematical Study About Cryptojacking in the Real World. Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :1701–1713.

As a new mechanism to monetize web content, cryptocurrency mining is becoming increasingly popular. The idea is simple: a webpage delivers extra workload (JavaScript) that consumes computational resources on the client machine to solve cryptographic puzzles, typically without notifying users or having explicit user consent. This new mechanism, often heavily abused and thus considered a threat termed "cryptojacking", is estimated to affect over 10 million web users every month; however, only a few anecdotal reports exist so far and little is known about its severeness, infrastructure, and technical characteristics behind the scene. This is likely due to the lack of effective approaches to detect cryptojacking at a large-scale (e.g., VirusTotal). In this paper, we take a first step towards an in-depth study over cryptojacking. By leveraging a set of inherent characteristics of cryptojacking scripts, we build CMTracker, a behavior-based detector with two runtime profilers for automatically tracking Cryptocurrency Mining scripts and their related domains. Surprisingly, our approach successfully discovered 2,770 unique cryptojacking samples from 853,936 popular web pages, including 868 among top 100K in Alexa list. Leveraging these samples, we gain a more comprehensive picture of the cryptojacking attacks, including their impact, distribution mechanisms, obfuscation, and attempts to evade detection. For instance, a diverse set of organizations benefit from cryptojacking based on the unique wallet ids. In addition, to stay under the radar, they frequently update their attack domains (fastflux) on the order of days. Many attackers also apply evasion techniques, including limiting the CPU usage, obfuscating the code, etc.