Biblio

Tor provides low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Due to the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client's connections to leak. Attacks using (features extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are called Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to measure the amount of leaked information about a website. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attacks and defenses.

Experimentation tools facilitate exploration of Tor performance and security research problems and allow researchers to safely and privately conduct Tor experiments without risking harm to real Tor users. However, researchers using these tools configure them to generate network traffic based on simplifying assumptions and outdated measurements and without understanding the efficacy of their configuration choices. In this work, we design a novel technique for dynamically learning Tor network traffic models using hidden Markov modeling and privacy-preserving measurement techniques. We conduct a safe but detailed measurement study of Tor using 17 relays (\textasciitilde2% of Tor bandwidth) over the course of 6 months, measuring general statistics and models that can be used to generate a sequence of streams and packets. We show how our measurement results and traffic models can be used to generate traffic flows in private Tor networks and how our models are more realistic than standard and alternative network traffic generation\textasciitildemethods.

Demand for end-to-end secure messaging has been growing rapidly and companies have responded by releasing applications that implement end-to-end secure messaging protocols. Signal and protocols based on Signal dominate the secure messaging applications. In this work we analyze conversational security properties provided by the Signal Android application against a variety of real world adversaries. We identify vulnerabilities that allow the Signal server to learn the contents of attachments, undetectably re-order and drop messages, and add and drop participants from group conversations. We then perform proof-of-concept attacks against the application to demonstrate the practicality of these vulnerabilities, and suggest mitigations that can detect our attacks. The main conclusion of our work is that we need to consider more than confidentiality and integrity of messages when designing future protocols. We also stress that protocols must protect against compromised servers and at a minimum implement a trust but verify model.