Biblio

Reconfigurable Scan Networks (RSNs) are a powerful tool for testing and maintenance of embedded systems, since they allow for flexible access to on-chip instrumentation such as built-in self-test and debug modules. RSNs, however, can be also exploited by malicious users as a side-channel in order to gain information about sensitive data or intellectual property and to recover secret keys. Hence, implementing appropriate counter-measures to secure the access to and data integrity of embedded instrumentation is of high importance. In this paper we present a novel hardware and software combined approach to ensure data privacy in IEEE Std 1687 (IJTAG) RSNs. To do so, both a secure IJTAG compliant plug-and-play instrument wrapper and a versatile software toolchain are introduced. The wrapper demonstrates the necessary architectural adaptations required when using a lightweight stream cipher, whereas the software toolchain provides a seamless integration of the testing workflow with stream cipher. The applicability of the method is demonstrated by an FPGA-based implementation. We report on the performance of the developed instrument wrapper, which is empirically shown to have only a small impact on the workflow in terms of hardware overhead, operational costs and test time overhead.

pubcrawl, Network on Chip Security, Scalability, resiliency, resilience, metrics, Vulnerabilities and design flaws in Network-on-Chip (NoC) routers can be exploited in order to spy, modify and constraint the sensitive communication inside the Multi-Processors Systems-on-Chip (MPSoCs). Although previous works address the NoC threat, finding secure and efficient solutions to verify the security is still a challenge. In this work, we propose for the first time a method to formally verify the correctness and the security properties of a NoC router in order to provide the proper communication functionality and to avoid NoC attacks. We present a generalized verification flow that proves a wide set of implementation-independent security-related properties to hold. We employ unbounded model checking techniques to account for the highly-sequential behaviour of the NoC systems. The evaluation results demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by presenting verification results of six different NoC routing architectures demonstrating the vulnerabilities of each design.