Biblio

The power terminal network has the characteristics of a large number of nodes, various types, and complex network topology. After the power terminal network is attacked, the impact of power terminals in different business scenarios is also different. Traditional impact assessment methods based on network traffic or power system operation rules are difficult to achieve comprehensive attack impact analysis. In this paper, from the three levels of terminal security itself, terminal network security and terminal business application security, it constructs quantitative indicators for analyzing the impact of power terminals after being attacked, so as to determine the depth and breadth of the impact of the attack on the power terminal network, and provide the next defense measures with realistic basis.

Lightweight virtualization represented by container technology provides a virtual environment for cloud services with more flexibility and efficiency due to the kernel-sharing property. However, the shared kernel also means that the system isolation mechanisms are incomplete. Attackers can scan the shared system configuration files to explore vulnerabilities for launching attacks. Previous works mainly eliminate the problem by fixing operating systems or using access control policies, but these methods require significant modifications and cannot meet the security needs of individual containers accurately. In this paper, we present ConfigRand, a moving target defense framework to prevent the information leakages due to the shared kernel in the container-based cloud. The ConfigRand deploys deceptive system configurations for each container, bounding the scan of attackers aimed at the shared kernel. In design of ConfigRand, we (1) propose a framework applying the moving target defense philosophy to periodically generate, distribute, and deploy the deceptive system configurations in the container-based cloud; (2) establish a model to formalize these configurations and quantify their heterogeneity; (3) present a configuration movement strategy to evaluate and optimize the variation of configurations. The results show that ConfigRand can effectively prevent the information leakages due to the shared kernel and apply to typical container applications with minimal system modification and performance degradation.

As an essential part to intelligently fine-grained scheduling, planning and maintenance in smart grid and energy internet, short-term load forecasting makes great progress recently owing to the big data collected from smart meters and the leap forward in machine learning technologies. However, the centralized computing topology of classical electric information system, where individual electricity consumption data are frequently transmitted to the cloud center for load forecasting, tends to violate electric consumers' privacy as well as to increase the pressure on network bandwidth. To tackle the tricky issues, we propose a privacy-preserving framework based on the edge-fog-cloud continuum for smart grid. Specifically, 1) we gravitate the training of load forecasting models and forecasting workloads to distributed smart meters so that consumers' raw data are handled locally, and only the forecasting outputs that have been protected are reported to the cloud center via fog nodes; 2) we protect the local forecasting models that imply electricity features from model extraction attacks by model randomization; 3) we exploit a shuffle scheme among smart meters to protect the data ownership privacy, and utilize a re-encryption scheme to guarantee the forecasting data privacy. Finally, through comprehensive simulation and analysis, we validate our proposed privacy-preserving framework in terms of privacy protection, and computation and communication efficiency.

Recent studies have shown that co-resident attacks have aroused great security threat in cloud. Since hardware is shared among different tenants, malicious tenants can launch various co-resident attacks, such as side channel attacks, covert channel attacks and resource interference attacks. Existing countermeasures have their limitations and can not provide comprehensive defense against co-resident attacks. This paper combines the advantages of various countermeasures and proposes a complete co-resident threat defense solution which consists of co-resident-resistant VM allocation (CRRVA), analytic hierarchy process-based threat score mechanism (AHPTSM) and attack-aware VM reallocation (AAVR). CRRVA securely allocates VMs and also takes load balance and power consumption into consideration to make the allocation policy more practical. According to the intrinsic characteristics of co-resident attacks, AHPTSM evaluates VM's threat score which denotes the probability that a VM is suffering or conducting co-resident attacks based on analytic hierarchy process. And AAVR further migrates VMs with extremely high threat scores and separates VM pairs which are likely to be malicious to each other. Extensive experiments in CloudSim have shown that CRRVA can greatly reduce the allocation co-resident threat as well as balancing the load for both CSPs and tenants with little impact on power consumption. In addition, guided by threat score distribution, AAVR can effectively guarantee runtime co-resident security by migrating high threat score VMs with less migration cost.