Biblio

Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBTs) are well positioned to take advantage of recent technology trends that have led to the development of low-power neural accelerators and low-cost high-performance sensors. However, a key challenge that needs to be dealt with is that despite all the advancements, edge devices remain resource-constrained, thus prohibiting complex deep neural networks from deploying and deriving actionable insights from various sensors. Furthermore, deploying sophisticated sensors in a distributed manner to improve decision-making also poses an extra challenge of coordinating and exchanging data between the nodes and server. We propose an architecture that abstracts away these thorny deployment considerations from an end-user (such as a commander or warfighter). Our architecture can automatically compile and deploy the inference model into a set of distributed nodes and server while taking into consideration of the resource availability, variation, and uncertainties.

Autonomic resource management for distributed edge computing systems provides an effective means of enabling dynamic placement and adaptation in the face of network changes, load dynamics, and failures. However, adaptation in-and-of-itself offers a side channel by which malicious entities can extract valuable information. An attacker can take advantage of autonomic resource management techniques to fool a system into misallocating resources and crippling applications. Using a few scenarios, we outline how attacks can be launched using partial knowledge of the resource management substrate - with as little as a single compromised node. We argue that any system that provides adaptation must consider resource management as an attack surface. As such, we propose ADAPT2, a framework that incorporates concepts taken from Moving-Target Defense and state estimation techniques to ensure correctness and obfuscate resource management, thereby protecting valuable system and application information from leaking.