Biblio

Filters: Author is Bretas, Arturo S.  [Clear All Filters]
2023-05-30
Aljohani, Nader, Agnew, Dennis, Nagaraj, Keerthiraj, Boamah, Sharon A., Mathieu, Reynold, Bretas, Arturo S., McNair, Janise, Zare, Alina.  2022.  Cross-Layered Cyber-Physical Power System State Estimation towards a Secure Grid Operation. 2022 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). :1—5.
In the Smart Grid paradigm, this critical infrastructure operation is increasingly exposed to cyber-threats due to the increased dependency on communication networks. An adversary can launch an attack on a power grid operation through False Data Injection into system measurements and/or through attacks on the communication network, such as flooding the communication channels with unnecessary data or intercepting messages. A cross-layered strategy that combines power grid data, communication grid monitoring and Machine Learning-based processing is a promising solution for detecting cyber-threats. In this paper, an implementation of an integrated solution of a cross-layer framework is presented. The advantage of such a framework is the augmentation of valuable data that enhances the detection of anomalies in the operation of power grid. IEEE 118-bus system is built in Simulink to provide a power grid testing environment and communication network data is emulated using SimComponents. The performance of the framework is investigated under various FDI and communication attacks.
2020-10-14
Trevizan, Rodrigo D., Ruben, Cody, Nagaraj, Keerthiraj, Ibukun, Layiwola L., Starke, Allen C., Bretas, Arturo S., McNair, Janise, Zare, Alina.  2019.  Data-driven Physics-based Solution for False Data Injection Diagnosis in Smart Grids. 2019 IEEE Power Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). :1—5.
This paper presents a data-driven and physics-based method for detection of false data injection (FDI) in Smart Grids (SG). As the power grid transitions to the use of SG technology, it becomes more vulnerable to cyber-attacks like FDI. Current strategies for the detection of bad data in the grid rely on the physics based State Estimation (SE) process and statistical tests. This strategy is naturally vulnerable to undetected bad data as well as false positive scenarios, which means it can be exploited by an intelligent FDI attack. In order to enhance the robustness of bad data detection, the paper proposes the use of data-driven Machine Intelligence (MI) working together with current bad data detection via a combined Chi-squared test. Since MI learns over time and uses past data, it provides a different perspective on the data than the SE, which analyzes only the current data and relies on the physics based model of the system. This combined bad data detection strategy is tested on the IEEE 118 bus system.