Biblio

The 5G technology brings the substantial improvement on the quality of services (QoS), such as higher throughput, lower latency, more stable signal and more ultra-reliable data transmission, triggering a revolution for the wireless mobile network. But in a general traffic channel in the 5G-based wireless mobile network, an attacker can detect a message transmitted over a channel, or even worse, forge or tamper with the message. Building a secure channel over the two parties is a feasible solution to this uttermost data transmission security challenge in 5G-based wireless mobile network. However, how to authentication the identities of the both parties before establishing the secure channel to fully ensure the data confidentiality and integrity during the data transmission has still been a open issue. To establish a fully secure channel, in this paper, we propose a strongly secure pairing-free certificateless authenticated key agreement (PF-CL-AKA) protocol with two-way identity-based authentication before extracting the secure session key. Our protocol is provably secure in the Lippold model, which means our protocol is still secure as long as each party of the channel has at least one uncompromised partial private term. Finally, By the theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, we can observe that our scheme is practical for the real-world applications in the 5G-based wireless mobile network.

Space-air-ground integrated network (SAGIN) is emerged as a versatile computing and traffic architecture in recent years. Though SAGIN brings many significant benefits for modern communication and computing services, there are many unprecedented challenges in SAGIN. The one critical challenge in SAGIN is the data security. In SAGIN, because the data will be stored in cleartext on cloud, the sensitive data may suffer from the illegal access by the unauthorized users even the untrusted cloud servers (CSs). Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE), which is a type of attribute-based encryption (ABE), has been regarded as a promising solution to the critical challenge of the data security on cloud. But there are two main blemishes in traditional CP-ABE. The first one is that there is only one attribute authority (AA) in CP-ABE. If the single AA crashs down, the whole system will be shut down. The second one is that the AA cannot effectively manage the life cycle of the users’ private keys. If a user on longer has one attribute, the AA cannot revoke the user’s private key of this attribute. This means the user can still decrypt some ciphertexts using this invalid attribute. In this paper, to solve the two flaws mentioned above, we propose a multi-authority CP-ABE (MA-CP-ABE) scheme with the dynamical key revocation (DKR). Our key revocation supports both user revocation and attribute revocation. And the our revocation is time friendly. What’s more, by using our dynamically tag-based revocation algorithm, AAs can dynamically and directly re-enable or revoke the invalid attributes to users. Finally, by evaluating and implementing our scheme, we can observe that our scheme is more comprehensive and practical for cloud applications in SAGIN.

In this paper, an attribute-based encryption scheme with policy hidden and key tracing under multi-authority is proposed. In our scheme, the access structure is embedded into the ciphertext implicitly and the attacker cannot gain user's private information by access structure. The key traceability is realized under multi-authority and collusion is prevented. Finally, based on the DBDH security model, it is proved that this scheme can resist the plaintext attack under the standard model.