Biblio
Searchable encryption will become more important as medical services intensify their use of big data and artificial intelligence. To use searchable encryption safely, the resistance of terminals with embedded searchable encryption to illegal attacks (tamper resistance) is extremely important. This study proposes a searchable encryption system embedded in terminals and evaluate the tamper resistance of the proposed system. This study also proposes attack scenarios and quantitatively evaluates the tamper resistance of the proposed system by performing experiments following the proposed attack scenarios.
For future Internet, information-centric networking (ICN) is considered a potential solution to many of its current problems, such as content distribution, mobility, and security. Named Data Networking (NDN) is a more popular ICN project. However, concern regarding the protection of user data persists. Information caching in NDN decouples content and content publishers, which leads to content security threats due to lack of secure controls. Therefore, this paper presents a CP-ABE (ciphertext policy attribute based encryption) access control scheme based on hash table and data segmentation (CHTDS). Based on data segmentation, CHTDS uses a method of linearly splitting fixed data blocks, which effectively improves data management. CHTDS also introduces CP-ABE mechanism and hash table data structure to ensure secure access control and privilege revocation does not need to re-encrypt the published content. The analysis results show that CHTDS can effectively realize the security and fine-grained access control in the NDN environment, and reduce communication overhead for content access.
To prevent unauthorized access to adversaries, strong authentication scheme is a vital security requirement in client-server inter-networking systems. These schemes must verify the legitimacy of such users in real-time environments and establish a dynamic session key fur subsequent communication. Of late, T. H. Chen and J. C. Huang proposed a two-factor authentication framework claiming that the scheme is secure against most of the existing attacks. However we have shown that Chen and Huang scheme have many critical weaknesses in real-time environments. The scheme is prone to man in the middle attack and information leakage attack. Furthermore, the scheme does not provide two essential security services such user anonymity and session key establishment. In this paper, we present an enhanced user participating authenticating scheme which overcomes all the weaknesses of Chen et al.'s scheme and provide most of the essential security features.
The Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) standards define test and debug architectures that are ingrained within much of today's commercial silicon. In particular, the IEEE Std. 1149.1 (Standard Test Access Port and Boundary Scan Architecture) forms the foundation of on-chip embedded instrumentation that is used extensively for everything from prototype board bring-up to firmware triage to field and depot system repair. More recently, JTAG is being used in-system as a hardware/firmware mechanism for Built-In Test (BIT), addressing No Fault Found (NFF) and materiel availability issues. Its power and efficacy are a direct outcome of being a ubiquitously available, embedded on-die instrument that is inherent in most electronic devices. While JTAG is indispensable for all aspects of test and debug, it suffers from a lack of inherent security. Unprotected, it can represent a security weakness, exposing a back-door vulnerability through which hackers can reverse engineer, extract sensitive data from, or disrupt systems. More explicitly, JTAG can be used to: - Read and write from system memory - Pause execution of firmware (by setting breakpoints) - Patch instructions or data in memory - Inject instructions directly into the pipeline of a target chip (without modifying memory) - Extract firmware (for reverse engineering/vulnerability research) - Execute private instructions to activate other engines within the chip As a low-level means of access to a powerful set of capabilities, the JTAG interface must be safeguarded against unauthorized intrusions and attacks. One method used to protect platforms against such attacks is to physically fuse off the JTAG Test Access Ports, either at the integrated circuit or the board level. But, given JTAG's utility, alternative approaches that allow for both security and debug have become available, especially if there is a hardware root of trust on the platform. These options include chip lock and key registers, challenge-response mechanisms, secure key systems, TDI/TDO encryption, and other authentication/authorization techniques. This paper reviews the options for safe access to JTAG-based debug and test embedded instrumentation.
Signal processing in encrypted domain has become an important mean to protect privacy in an untrusted network environment. Due to the limitations of the underlying encryption methods, many useful algorithms that are sophisticated are not well implemented. Considering that QR decomposition is widely used in many fields, in this paper, we propose to implement QR decomposition in homomorphic encrypted domain. We firstly realize some necessary primitive operations in homomorphic encrypted domain, including division and open square operation. Gram-Schmidt process is then studied in the encrypted domain. We propose the implementation of QR decomposition in the encrypted domain by using the secure implementation of Gram-Schmidt process. We conduct experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness and analyze the performance of the proposed outsourced QR decomposition.
Research Purpose: The distributed, traceable and security of blockchain technology are applicable to the construction of new government information resource models, which could eliminate the barn effect and trust in government information sharing, as well as promoting the transformation of government affairs from management to service, it is also of great significance to the sharing of government information and construction of service-oriented e-government. Propose Methods: By analyzing the current problems of government information sharing, combined with literature research, this paper proposes the theoretical framework and advantages of blockchain technology applied to government information management and sharing, expounds the blockchain-based solution, it also constructs a government information sharing model based on blockchain, and gives implementation strategies at the technical and management levels. Results and Conclusion: The government information sharing model based on the blockchain solution and the transparency of government information can be used as a research framework for information interaction analysis between the government and users. It can also promote the construction and development of information sharing for Chinese government, as well as providing unified information sharing solution at the departmental and regional levels for e-government.
In the modern security-conscious world, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) proxies are increasingly often used on industrial and enterprise networks to perform TLS unwrapping on all outbound connections. However, enabling TLS unwrapping requires local devices to have the DPI proxy Certificate Authority certificates installed. While for conventional computing devices this is addressed via enterprise management, it's a difficult problem for Internet of Things ("IoT") devices which are generally not under enterprise management, and may not even be capable of it due to their resource-constrained nature. Thus, for typical IoT devices, being installed on a network with DPI requires either manual device configuration or custom DPI proxy configuration, both of which solutions have significant shortcomings. This poses a serious challenge to the deployment of IoT devices on DPI-enabled intranets. The authors propose a solution to this problem: a method of installing on IoT devices the CA certificates for DPI proxy CAs, as well as other security configuration ("security bootstrapping"). The proposed solution respects the DPI policies, while allowing the commissioning of IoT and IIoT devices without the need for additional manual configuration either at device scope or at network scope. This is accomplished by performing the bootstrap operation over unsecured connection, and downloading certificates using TLS validation at application level. The resulting solution is light-weight and secure, yet does not require validation of the DPI proxy's CA certificates in order to perform the security bootstrapping, thus avoiding the chicken-and-egg problem inherent in using TLS on DPI-enabled intranets.