Using Run-Time Checking to Provide Safety and Progress for Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) may interact and manipulate objects in the physical world, and therefore ideally would have formal guarantees about their behavior. Performing statictime proofs of safety invariants, however, may be intractable for systems with distributed physical-world interactions. This is further complicated when realistic communication models are considered, for which there may not be bounds on message delays, or even that messages will eventually reach their destination. In this work, we address the challenge of proving safety and progress in distributed CPS communicating over an unreliable communication layer. This is done in two parts. First, we show that system safety can be verified by partially relying upon runtime checks, and that dropping messages if the run-time checks fail will maintain safety. Second, we use a notion of compatible action chains to guarantee system progress, despite unbounded message delays.We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a multi-agent vehicle flocking system, and show that the overhead of the proposed run-time checks is not overbearing.