Cascading Attacks Against Smart Grid Using Control Command Disaggregation and Services

In this paper, we propose new types of cascading attacks against smart grid that use control command disaggregation and core smart grid services. Although there have been tremendous research efforts in injection attacks against the smart grid, to our knowledge most studies focus on false meter data injection, and false command and false feedback injection attacks have been scarcely investigated. In addition, control command disaggregation has not been addressed from a security point of view, in spite of the fact that it is becoming one of core concepts in the smart grid and hence analysing its security implications is crucial to the smart grid security. Our cascading attacks use false control command, false feedback or false meter data injection, and cascade the effects of such injections throughout the smart grid subsystems and components. Our analysis and evaluation results show that the proposed attacks can cause serious service disruptions in the smart grid. The evaluation has been performed on a widely used smart grid simulation platform.