Visible to the public Timing SDN Control Planes to Infer Network Configurations

TitleTiming SDN Control Planes to Infer Network Configurations
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2016
AuthorsSonchack, John, Aviv, Adam J., Keller, Eric
Conference NameProceedings of the 2016 ACM International Workshop on Security in Software Defined Networks & Network Function Virtualization
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4078-6
Keywordscontrol plane attack, inference attack, OpenFlow, pubcrawl, Resiliency, Scalability, SDN security, software defined networking
Abstract

In this paper, we study information leakage by control planes of Software Defined Networks. We find that the response time of an OpenFlow control plane depends on its workload, and we develop an inference attack that an adversary with control of a single host could use to learn about network configurations without needing to compromise any network infrastructure (i.e. switches or controller servers). We also demonstrate that our inference attack works on real OpenFlow hardware. To our knowledge, no previous work has evaluated OpenFlow inference attacks outside of simulation.

URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2876019.2876030
DOI10.1145/2876019.2876030
Citation Keysonchack_timing_2016