| Title | Securing Split Manufactured ICs with Wire Lifting Obfuscated Built-In Self-Authentication |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2017 |
| Authors | Shi, Qihang, Xiao, Kan, Forte, Domenic, Tehranipoor, Mark M. |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017 |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-4972-7 |
| Keywords | Hardware security and trust, hardware trojan prevention, Human Behavior, Metrics, pubcrawl, Scalability, split manufacturing, Tamper resistance, untrusted foundry |
| Abstract | Hardware Trojan insertion and intellectual property (IP) theft are two major concerns when dealing with untrusted foundries. Most existing mitigation techniques are limited in protecting against both vulnerabilities. Split manufacturing is designed to stop IP piracy and IC cloning, but it fails at preventing untargeted hardware Trojan insertion and incurs significant overheads when high level of security is demanded. Built-in self-authentication (BISA) is a low cost technique for preventing and detecting hardware Trojan insertion, but is vulnerable to IP piracy, IC cloning or redesign attacks, especially on original circuitry. In this paper, we propose an obfuscated built-in self-authentication (OBISA) technique that combines and optimizes both technique so that they complement and improve security against both vulnerabilities. Performance of the proposed OBISA technique is presented with experimental implementation on same benchmark circuits as used in the existing wire lifting technique. The security performance is evaluated with the most popular split manufacturing security metrics. |
| URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3060403.3060588 |
| DOI | 10.1145/3060403.3060588 |
| Citation Key | shi_securing_2017 |
Securing Split Manufactured ICs with Wire Lifting Obfuscated Built-In Self-Authentication