Visible to the public Attack Scenario Modeling for Smart Grids Assessment Through Simulation

TitleAttack Scenario Modeling for Smart Grids Assessment Through Simulation
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsTundis, Andrea, Egert, Rolf, Mühlhäuser, Max
Conference NameProceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
PublisherACM
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-5257-4
Keywordscomposability, Cyber-physical systems, Metrics, Modeling Attacks, physical layer security, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, security, simulation, Smart grids
AbstractSmart Grids (SGs) are Critical Infrastructures (CI), which are responsible for controlling and maintaining the distribution of electricity. To manage this task, modern SGs integrate an Information and Communication Infrastructure (ICT) beside the electrical power grid. Aside from the benefits derived from the increasing control and management capabilities offered by the ICT, unfortunately the introduction of this cyber layer provides an attractive attack surface for hackers. As a consequence, security becomes a fundamental prerequisite to be fulfilled. In this context, the adoption of Systems Engineering (SE) tools combined with Modeling and Simulation (M&S) techniques represent a promising solution to support the evaluation process of a SG during early design stages. In particular, the paper investigates on the identification, modeling and assessment of attacks in SG environments, by proposing a model for representing attack scenarios as a combination of attack types, attack schema and their temporal occurrence. Simulation techniques are exploited to enable the execution of such attack combinations in the SG domain. Specifically, a simulator, which allows to assess the SG behaviour to identify possible flaws and provide preventive actions before its realization, is developed on the basis of the proposed model and exemplified through a case study.
URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3098954.3098966
DOI10.1145/3098954.3098966
Citation Keytundis_attack_2017