| Title | AT-ROP: Using static analysis and binary patch technology to defend against ROP attacks based on return instruction |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2020 |
| Authors | Xu, Shenglin, Xie, Peidai, Wang, Yongjun |
| Conference Name | 2020 International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Software Engineering (TASE) |
| Keywords | binary patch, composability, feature extraction, human factors, Linux, parameter registers, Programming, pubcrawl, Resiliency, return oriented programming, rop attacks, Scalability, Software, static analysis, Tools, Writing |
| Abstract | Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is one of the most common techniques to exploit software vulnerabilities. Although many solutions to defend against ROP attacks have been proposed, they still have various drawbacks, such as requiring additional information (source code, debug symbols, etc.), increasing program running cost, and causing program instability. In this paper, we propose a method: using static analysis and binary patch technology to defend against ROP attacks based on return instruction. According to this method, we implemented the AT- ROP tool in a Linux 64-bit system environment. Compared to existing tools, it clears the parameter registers when the function returns. As a result, it makes the binary to defend against ROP attacks based on return instruction without having to obtain the source code of the binary. We use the binary challenges in the CTF competition and the binary programs commonly used in the Linux environment to experiment. It turns out that AT-ROP can make the binary program have the ability to defend against ROP attacks based on return instruction with a small increase in the size of the binary program and without affecting its normal execution. |
| DOI | 10.1109/TASE49443.2020.00036 |
| Citation Key | xu_at-rop_2020 |
AT-ROP: Using static analysis and binary patch technology to defend against ROP attacks based on return instruction