| Title | Formal Analysis and Verification of Industrial Control System Security via Timed Automata |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2020 |
| Authors | Wang, Guoqing, Zhuang, Lei, Liu, Taotao, Li, Shuxia, Yang, Sijin, Lan, Julong |
| Conference Name | 2020 International Conference on Internet of Things and Intelligent Applications (ITIA) |
| Keywords | Automata, Clocks, cyber physical systems, Human Behavior, human factors, ICS security, Malware, malware detection, Metrics, model checking, multiple fault diagnosis, PLC, process control, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, security, timed automata, Valves |
| Abstract | The industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) can facilitate industrial upgrading, intelligent manufacturing, and lean production. Industrial control system (ICS) is a vital support mechanism for many key infrastructures in the IIoT. However, natural defects in the ICS network security mechanism and the susceptibility of the programmable logic controller (PLC) program to malicious attack pose a threat to the safety of national infrastructure equipment. To improve the security of the underlying equipment in ICS, a model checking method based on timed automata is proposed in this work, which can effectively model the control process and accurately simulate the system state when incorporating time factors. Formal analysis of the ICS and PLC is then conducted to formulate malware detection rules which can constrain the normal behavior of the system. The model checking tool UPPAAL is then used to verify the properties by detecting whether there is an exception in the system and determine the behavior of malware through counter-examples. The chemical reaction control system in Tennessee-Eastman process is taken as an example to carry out modeling, characterization, and verification, and can effectively detect multiple patterns of malware and propose relevant security policy recommendations. |
| DOI | 10.1109/ITIA50152.2020.9312289 |
| Citation Key | wang_formal_2020 |
Formal Analysis and Verification of Industrial Control System Security via Timed Automata