Visible to the public An Interactive Prover for Protocol Verification in the Computational Model

TitleAn Interactive Prover for Protocol Verification in the Computational Model
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2021
AuthorsBaelde, David, Delaune, Stéphanie, Jacomme, Charlie, Koutsos, Adrien, Moreau, Solène
Conference Name2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
KeywordsCognition, Collaboration, composability, compositionality, Computational modeling, computational security, formal methods, Interactive Prover, observational equivalence, policy-based collaboration, privacy, protocol verification, Protocols, pubcrawl, security protocols, Semantics, Solids, Tools
AbstractGiven the central importance of designing secure protocols, providing solid mathematical foundations and computer-assisted methods to attest for their correctness is becoming crucial. Here, we elaborate on the formal approach introduced by Bana and Comon in [10], [11], which was originally designed to analyze protocols for a fixed number of sessions, and lacks support for proof mechanization.In this paper, we present a framework and an interactive prover allowing to mechanize proofs of security protocols for an arbitrary number of sessions in the computational model. More specifically, we develop a meta-logic as well as a proof system for deriving security properties. Proofs in our system only deal with high-level, symbolic representations of protocol executions, similar to proofs in the symbolic model, but providing security guarantees at the computational level. We have implemented our approach within a new interactive prover, the Squirrel prover, taking as input protocols specified in the applied pi-calculus, and we have performed a number of case studies covering a variety of primitives (hashes, encryption, signatures, Diffie-Hellman exponentiation) and security properties (authentication, strong secrecy, unlinkability).
DOI10.1109/SP40001.2021.00078
Citation Keybaelde_interactive_2021