Visible to the public A Randomized Montgomery Powering Ladder Exponentiation for Side-Channel Attack Resilient RSA and Leakage Assessment

TitleA Randomized Montgomery Powering Ladder Exponentiation for Side-Channel Attack Resilient RSA and Leakage Assessment
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2021
AuthorsKolagatla, Venkata Reddy, J, Mervin, Darbar, Shabbir, Selvakumar, David, Saha, Sankha
Conference Name2021 25th International Symposium on VLSI Design and Test (VDAT)
Date Publishedsep
Keywordsexponentiation, Masking through Randomization of Computations, Montgomery Powering Ladder, multiprotocol label switching, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Resistance, Scalability, Side Channel Leakage assessment and analysis, Side Channel Resilient RSA, side-channel attacks, Timing, Very large scale integration
AbstractThis paper presents a randomized Montgomery Powering Ladder Modular Exponentiation (RMPLME) scheme for side channel attacks (SCA) resistant Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and its leakage resilience analysis. This method randomizes the computation time of square-and-multiply operations for each exponent bit of the Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) based RSA exponentiation using various radices (Radix - 2, 22, and 24) based Montgomery Modular multipliers (MMM) randomly. The randomized computations of RMPLME generates non-uniform timing channels information and power traces thus protecting against SCA. In this work, we have developed and implemented a) an unmasked right-to-left Montgomery Modular Exponentiation (R-L MME), b) MPL exponentiation and c) the proposed RMPLME schemes for RSA decryption. All the three realizations have been assessed for side channel leakage using Welch's t-test and analyzed for secured realizations based on degree of side channel information leakage. RMPLME scheme shows the least side-channel leakage and resilient against SPA, DPA, C-Safe Error, CPA and Timing Attacks.
DOI10.1109/VDAT53777.2021.9601132
Citation Keykolagatla_randomized_2021