| Title | Covert Channel Detection Methods |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2022 |
| Authors | Ondov, Adrián, Helebrandt, Pavol |
| Conference Name | 2022 20th International Conference on Emerging eLearning Technologies and Applications (ICETA) |
| Date Published | oct |
| Keywords | compositionality, covert channel, covert channels, Firewalls (computing), Protocols, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, security, Software, software reliability, statistical analysis, Task Analysis, Timing, V2X communication |
| Abstract | The modern networking world is being exposed to many risks more frequently every day. Most of systems strongly rely on remaining anonymous throughout the whole endpoint exploitation process. Covert channels represent risk since they ex-ploit legitimate communications and network protocols to evade typical filtering. This firewall avoidance sees covert channels frequently used for malicious communication of intruders with systems they compromised, and thus a real threat to network security. While there are commercial tools to safeguard computer networks, novel applications such as automotive connectivity and V2X present new challenges. This paper focuses on the analysis of the recent ways of using covert channels and detecting them, but also on the state-of-the-art possibilities of protection against them. We investigate observing the timing covert channels behavior simulated via injected ICMP traffic into standard network communications. Most importantly, we concentrate on enhancing firewall with detection and prevention of such attack built-in features. The main contribution of the paper is design for detection timing covert channel threats utilizing detection methods based on statistical analysis. These detection methods are combined and implemented in one program as a simple host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS). As a result, the proposed design can analyze and detect timing covert channels, with the addition of taking preventive measures to block any future attempts to breach the security of an end device. |
| DOI | 10.1109/ICETA57911.2022.9974878 |
| Citation Key | ondov_covert_2022 |
Covert Channel Detection Methods