Title | Known Plaintext Attacks on the Omar and abed Homomorphic Encryption Scheme |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2022 |
Authors | Choi, Seongbong, Lee, Hyung Tae |
Conference Name | 2022 13th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC) |
Date Published | oct |
Keywords | convergence, homomorphic encryption, Human Behavior, human factors, information and communication technology, known plaintext attacks, Metrics, noise-free, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, security analysis, symmetric key encryption, Toy manufacturing industry |
Abstract | In 2020, Omar and abed proposed a new noise-free fully homomorphic encryption scheme that allows arbitrary computations on encrypted data without decryption. However, they did not provide a sufficient security analysis of the proposed scheme and just stated that it is secure under the integer factorization assumption. In this paper, we present known plaintext attacks on their scheme and illustrate them with toy examples. Our attack algorithms are quite simple: They require several times of greatest common divisor (GCD) computations using only a few pair of message and ciphertext. |
DOI | 10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952419 |
Citation Key | choi_known_2022 |