Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Andrew Clark, University of Washington  [Clear All Filters]
2017-02-10
Andrew Clark, University of Washington, Quanyan Zhu, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Radha Poovendran, University of Washington, Tamer Başar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  2012.  Deceptive Routing in Relay Networks. Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security.

Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network trac. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for sel sh and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.