Mismorphism: A Semiotic Model of Computer Security Circumvention (poster abstract)

In real world domains, from healthcare to power to finance, we deploy computer systems intended to streamline and im- prove the activities of human agents in the corresponding non-cyber worlds. However, talking to actual users (instead of just computer security experts) reveals endemic circum- vention of the computer-embedded rules. Good-intentioned users, trying to get their jobs done, systematically work around security and other controls embedded in their IT systems.

This poster reports on our work compiling a large corpus of such incidents and developing a model based on semi- otic triads to examine security circumvention. This model suggests that mismorphisms--mappings that fail to preserve structure--lie at the heart of circumvention scenarios; dif- ferential perceptions and needs explain users' actions. We support this claim with empirical data from the corpus.