Ultimate Forwarding Resilience in OpenFlow Networks
| Title | Ultimate Forwarding Resilience in OpenFlow Networks |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2017 |
| Authors | Christopher Hannon, Illinois Institute of Technology, Dong Jin, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chen Chen, Argonne National Laboratory, Jianhui Wang, Argonne National Laboratory |
| Conference Name | ACM International Workshop on Security in Software Defined Networks & Network Function Virtualization (SDN-NFV Security 2017) |
| Date Published | 03/2017 |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | Scottsdale, AZ |
| Keywords | A Hypothesis Testing Framework for Network Security, expandability, NSA SoS Lablets Materials, Resiliency, science of security, UIUC |
| Abstract | Software defined networking is a rapidly expanding networking paradigm that aims to separate the control logic from the forwarding devices. Through centralized control, network operators are able to deploy and manage more efficient forwarding strategies. Traditionally, when the network undergoes a change through maintenance, failure, or cyber attack, the centralized controller processes these events and deploys new forwarding rules reactively. This work provides a strategy that does not require a controller in order to maintain connectivity while only using features within the existing OpenFlow protocol version 1.3 or greater. In this paper we illustrate why forwarding resiliency is desired in OpenFlow networks and provide an algorithm that computes the flow entries required to achieve maximal forwarding resiliency in presence of both multiple link and controller failures on any arbitrary network. |
| Citation Key | node-34793 |
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