Visible to the public TWC: Small: Securing Smart Power Grids under Data Measurement Cyber ThreatsConflict Detection Enabled

Project Details

Performance Period

Aug 16, 2015 - Jul 31, 2018

Institution(s)

Syracuse University

Award Number


Power systems are changing with the rapid deployment of remote sensing devices such as Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) and integration of more capable Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. PMU measurements, generated every second, are used by power system operators to make critical decisions. With more utilities adopting PMUs for real-time system monitoring, power systems are exposed to more cyber-threats targeting these devices.

This research investigates means to determine the impacts of data intrusion on PMU devices, and will propose mitigation strategies. The outcomes will identify cyber-attacks that can result in cascading blackouts as well as the most critical components of power systems that are likely to be targeted by cyber threats. This multidisciplinary research will focus on three fundamental goals: (1) Quantifying the impact and severity of false data injection; (2) Detection of anomalies; and (3) Mitigation of the impacts. The project delineates differences between trivial and critical data manipulations and evinces the need to protect some measurements more than others. The project will systematically identify the most critical power system measurements that are best candidates for additional protection.

The findings of this research will establish the foundations for protecting the most critical assets in power grids. As part of the broader impacts of this research, a diverse group of graduate and undergraduate students, especially women and underrepresented students can be trained in smart grid protection and planning. Mitigation methods proposed in this research can be extended to other complex networks and the proposed methods for identifying most critical components can be employed in other industries.