Biblio

A Robot Operating System (ROS) plays a significant role in organizing industrial robots for manufacturing. With an increasing number of the robots, the operators integrate a ROS with networked communication to share the data. This cyber-physical nature exposes the ROS to cyber attacks. To this end, this paper proposes a cross-layer approach to achieve secure and resilient control of a ROS. In the physical layer, due to the delay caused by the security mechanism, we design a time-delay controller for the ROS agent. In the cyber layer, we define cyber states and use Markov Decision Process to evaluate the tradeoffs between physical and security performance. Due to the uncertainty of the cyber state, we extend the MDP to a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP). We propose a threshold solution based on our theoretical results. Finally, we present numerical examples to evaluate the performance of the secure and resilient mechanism.

The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications that leverage ubiquitous connectivity and big data are facilitating the realization of smart everything initiatives. IoT-enabled infrastructures have naturally a multi-layer system architecture with an overlaid or underlaid device network and its coexisting infrastructure network. The connectivity between different components in these two heterogeneous networks plays an important role in delivering real-time information and ensuring a high-level situational awareness. However, IoT- enabled infrastructures face cyber threats due to the wireless nature of communications. Therefore, maintaining the network connectivity in the presence of adversaries is a critical task for the infrastructure network operators. In this paper, we establish a three-player three-stage game-theoretic framework including two network operators and one attacker to capture the secure design of multi- layer infrastructure networks by allocating limited resources. We use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the strategies of players with sequential moves. In addition, we assess the efficiency of the equilibrium network by comparing with its team optimal solution counterparts in which two network operators can coordinate. We further design a scalable algorithm to guide the construction of the equilibrium IoT-enabled infrastructure networks. Finally, we use case studies on the emerging paradigm of Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to corroborate the obtained results.

The Internet of things (IoT) is revolutionizing the management and control of automated systems leading to a paradigm shift in areas such as smart homes, smart cities, health care, transportation, etc. The IoT technology is also envisioned to play an important role in improving the effectiveness of military operations in battlefields. The interconnection of combat equipment and other battlefield resources for coordinated automated decisions is referred to as the Internet of battlefield things (IoBT). IoBT networks are significantly different from traditional IoT networks due to the battlefield specific challenges such as the absence of communication infrastructure, and the susceptibility of devices to cyber and physical attacks. The combat efficiency and coordinated decision-making in war scenarios depends highly on real-time data collection, which in turn relies on the connectivity of the network and the information dissemination in the presence of adversaries. This work aims to build the theoretical foundations of designing secure and reconfigurable IoBT networks. Leveraging the theories of stochastic geometry and mathematical epidemiology, we develop an integrated framework to study the communication of mission-critical data among different types of network devices and consequently design the network in a cost effective manner.

The Internet of things (IoT) is revolutionizing the management and control of automated systems leading to a paradigm shift in areas, such as smart homes, smart cities, health care, and transportation. The IoT technology is also envisioned to play an important role in improving the effectiveness of military operations in battlefields. The interconnection of combat equipment and other battlefield resources for coordinated automated decisions is referred to as the Internet of battlefield things (IoBT). IoBT networks are significantly different from traditional IoT networks due to battlefield specific challenges, such as the absence of communication infrastructure, heterogeneity of devices, and susceptibility to cyber-physical attacks. The combat efficiency and coordinated decision-making in war scenarios depends highly on real-time data collection, which in turn relies on the connectivity of the network and information dissemination in the presence of adversaries. This paper aims to build the theoretical foundations of designing secure and reconfigurable IoBT networks. Leveraging the theories of stochastic geometry and mathematical epidemiology, we develop an integrated framework to quantify the information dissemination among heterogeneous network devices. Consequently, a tractable optimization problem is formulated that can assist commanders in cost effectively planning the network and reconfiguring it according to the changing mission requirements.

With a large number of sensors and control units in networked systems, distributed support vector machines (DSVMs) play a fundamental role in scalable and efficient multi-sensor classification and prediction tasks. However, DSVMs are vulnerable to adversaries who can modify and generate data to deceive the system to misclassification and misprediction. This work aims to design defense strategies for DSVM learner against a potential adversary. We use a game-theoretic framework to capture the conflicting interests between the DSVM learner and the attacker. The Nash equilibrium of the game allows predicting the outcome of learning algorithms in adversarial environments, and enhancing the resilience of the machine learning through dynamic distributed algorithms. We develop a secure and resilient DSVM algorithm with rejection method, and show its resiliency against adversary with numerical experiments.

Enhancing the security and resilience of interdependent infrastructures is crucial. In this paper, we establish a theoretical framework based on Markov decision processes (MDPs) to design optimal resiliency mechanisms for interdependent infrastructures. We use MDPs to capture the dynamics of the failure of constituent components of an infrastructure and their cyber-physical dependencies. Factored MDPs and approximate linear programming are adopted for an exponentially growing dimension of both state and action spaces. Under our approximation scheme, the optimally distributed policy is equivalent to the centralized one. Finally, case studies in a large-scale interdependent system demonstrate the effectiveness of the control strategy to enhance the network resilience to cascading failures.

With the fast development of autonomous driving and vehicular communication technologies, intelligent transportation systems that are based on VANET (Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network) have shown great promise. For instance, through V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) and V2I (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) communication, intelligent intersections allow more fine-grained control of vehicle crossings and significantly enhance traffic efficiency. However, the performance and safety of these VANET-based systems could be seriously impaired by communication delays and packet losses, which may be caused by network congestion or by malicious attacks that target communication timing behavior. In this paper, we quantitatively model and analyze some of the timing and security issues in transportation networks with VANET-based intelligent intersections. In particular, we demonstrate how communication delays may affect the performance and safety of a single intersection and of multiple interconnected intersections, and present our delay-tolerant intersection management protocols. We also discuss the issues of such protocols when the vehicles are non-cooperative and how they may be addressed with game theory.