Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Saputro, N.  [Clear All Filters]
2021-02-23
Aydeger, A., Saputro, N., Akkaya, K..  2020.  Cloud-based Deception against Network Reconnaissance Attacks using SDN and NFV. 2020 IEEE 45th Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN). :279—285.

An attacker's success crucially depends on the reconnaissance phase of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which is the first step to gather intelligence. Although several solutions have been proposed against network reconnaissance attacks, they fail to address the needs of legitimate users' requests. Thus, we propose a cloud-based deception framework which aims to confuse the attacker with reconnaissance replies while allowing legitimate uses. The deception is based on for-warding the reconnaissance packets to a cloud infrastructure through tunneling and SDN so that the returned IP addresses to the attacker will not be genuine. For handling legitimate requests, we create a reflected virtual topology in the cloud to match any changes in the original physical network to the cloud topology using SDN. Through experimentations on GENI platform, we show that our framework can provide reconnaissance responses with negligible delays to the network clients while also reducing the management costs significantly.

2018-02-06
Nojoumian, M., Golchubian, A., Saputro, N., Akkaya, K..  2017.  Preventing Collusion between SDN Defenders Anc Attackers Using a Game Theoretical Approach. 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS). :802–807.

In this paper, a game-theoretical solution concept is utilized to tackle the collusion attack in a SDN-based framework. In our proposed setting, the defenders (i.e., switches) are incentivized not to collude with the attackers in a repeated-game setting that utilizes a reputation system. We first illustrate our model and its components. We then use a socio-rational approach to provide a new anti-collusion solution that shows cooperation with the SDN controller is always Nash Equilibrium due to the existence of a long-term utility function in our model.