Biblio

Scientific computing sometimes involves computation on sensitive data. Depending on the data and the execution environment, the HPC (high-performance computing) user or data provider may require confidentiality and/or integrity guarantees. To study the applicability of hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) to enable secure scientific computing, we deeply analyze the performance impact of general purpose TEEs, AMD SEV, and Intel SGX, for diverse HPC benchmarks including traditional scientific computing, machine learning, graph analytics, and emerging scientific computing workloads. We observe three main findings: 1) SEV requires careful memory placement on large scale NUMA machines (1×-3.4× slowdown without and 1×-1.15× slowdown with NUMA aware placement), 2) virtualization-a prerequisite for SEV- results in performance degradation for workloads with irregular memory accesses and large working sets (1×-4× slowdown compared to native execution for graph applications) and 3) SGX is inappropriate for HPC given its limited secure memory size and inflexible programming model (1.2×-126× slowdown over unsecure execution). Finally, we discuss forthcoming new TEE designs and their potential impact on scientific computing.

The deployment of DER with smart-inverter functionality is increasing the controllable assets on power distribution networks and, consequently, the cyber-physical attack surface. Within this work, we consider the use of reinforcement learning as an online controller that adjusts DER Volt/Var and Volt/Watt control logic to mitigate network voltage unbalance. We specifically focus on the case where a network-aware cyber-physical attack has compromised a subset of single-phase DER, causing a large voltage unbalance. We show how deep reinforcement learning successfully learns a policy minimizing the unbalance, both during normal operation and during a cyber-physical attack. In mitigating the attack, the learned stochastic policy operates alongside legacy equipment on the network, i.e. tap-changing transformers, adjusting optimally predefined DER control-logic.

Science DMZs are specialized networks that enable large-scale distributed scientific research, providing efficient and guaranteed performance while transferring large amounts of data at high rates. The high-speed performance of a Science DMZ is made viable via data transfer nodes (DTNs), therefore they are a critical point of failure. DTNs are usually monitored with network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). However, NIDS do not consider system performance data, such as network I/O interrupts and context switches, which can also be useful in revealing anomalous system performance potentially arising due to external network based attacks or insider attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate how system performance metrics can be applied towards securing a DTN in a Science DMZ network. Specifically, we evaluate the effectiveness of system performance data in detecting TCP-SYN flood attacks on a DTN using DBSCAN (a density-based clustering algorithm) for anomaly detection. Our results demonstrate that system interrupts and context switches can be used to successfully detect TCP-SYN floods, suggesting that system performance data could be effective in detecting a variety of attacks not easily detected through network monitoring alone.

In this paper, we propose principles of information control and sharing that support ORCON (ORiginator COntrolled access control) models while simultaneously improving components of confidentiality, availability, and integrity needed to inherently support, when needed, responsibility to share policies, rapid information dissemination, data provenance, and data redaction. This new paradigm of providing unfettered and unimpeded access to information by authorized users, while at the same time, making access by unauthorized users impossible, contrasts with historical approaches to information sharing that have focused on need to know rather than need to (or responsibility to) share.