Biblio

Science DMZs are specialized networks that enable large-scale distributed scientific research, providing efficient and guaranteed performance while transferring large amounts of data at high rates. The high-speed performance of a Science DMZ is made viable via data transfer nodes (DTNs), therefore they are a critical point of failure. DTNs are usually monitored with network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). However, NIDS do not consider system performance data, such as network I/O interrupts and context switches, which can also be useful in revealing anomalous system performance potentially arising due to external network based attacks or insider attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate how system performance metrics can be applied towards securing a DTN in a Science DMZ network. Specifically, we evaluate the effectiveness of system performance data in detecting TCP-SYN flood attacks on a DTN using DBSCAN (a density-based clustering algorithm) for anomaly detection. Our results demonstrate that system interrupts and context switches can be used to successfully detect TCP-SYN floods, suggesting that system performance data could be effective in detecting a variety of attacks not easily detected through network monitoring alone.

The gap is widening between the processor clock speed of end-system architectures and network throughput capabilities. It is now physically possible to provide single-flow throughput of speeds up to 100 Gbps, and 400 Gbps will soon be possible. Most current research into high-speed data networking focuses on managing expanding network capabilities within datacenter Local Area Networks (LANs) or efficiently multiplexing millions of relatively small flows through a Wide Area Network (WAN). However, datacenter hyper-convergence places high-throughput networking workloads on general-purpose hardware, and distributed High-Performance Computing (HPC) applications require time-sensitive, high-throughput end-to-end flows (also referred to as ``elephant flows'') to occur over WANs. For these applications, the bottleneck is often the end-system and not the intervening network. Since the problem of the end-system bottleneck was uncovered, many techniques have been developed which address this mismatch with varying degrees of effectiveness. In this survey, we describe the most promising techniques, beginning with network architectures and NIC design, continuing with operating and end-system architectures, and concluding with clean-slate protocol design.