Visible to the public Biblio

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2023-02-02
Schuckert, Felix, Langweg, Hanno, Katt, Basel.  2022.  Systematic Generation of XSS and SQLi Vulnerabilities in PHP as Test Cases for Static Code Analysis. 2022 IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW). :261–268.
Synthetic static code analysis test suites are important to test the basic functionality of tools. We present a framework that uses different source code patterns to generate Cross Site Scripting and SQL injection test cases. A decision tree is used to determine if the test cases are vulnerable. The test cases are split into two test suites. The first test suite contains 258,432 test cases that have influence on the decision trees. The second test suite contains 20 vulnerable test cases with different data flow patterns. The test cases are scanned with two commercial static code analysis tools to show that they can be used to benchmark and identify problems of static code analysis tools. Expert interviews confirm that the decision tree is a solid way to determine the vulnerable test cases and that the test suites are relevant.
2020-09-11
Shukla, Ankur, Katt, Basel, Nweke, Livinus Obiora.  2019.  Vulnerability Discovery Modelling With Vulnerability Severity. 2019 IEEE Conference on Information and Communication Technology. :1—6.
Web browsers are primary targets of attacks because of their extensive uses and the fact that they interact with sensitive data. Vulnerabilities present in a web browser can pose serious risk to millions of users. Thus, it is pertinent to address these vulnerabilities to provide adequate protection for personally identifiable information. Research done in the past has showed that few vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) highlight the characterization of vulnerability discovery process. In these models, severity which is one of the most crucial properties has not been considered. Vulnerabilities can be categorized into different levels based on their severity. The discovery process of each kind of vulnerabilities is different from the other. Hence, it is essential to incorporate the severity of the vulnerabilities during the modelling of the vulnerability discovery process. This paper proposes a model to assess the vulnerabilities present in the software quantitatively with consideration for the severity of the vulnerabilities. It is possible to apply the proposed model to approximate the number of vulnerabilities along with vulnerability discovery rate, future occurrence of vulnerabilities, risk analysis, etc. Vulnerability data obtained from one of the major web browsers (Google Chrome) is deployed to examine goodness-of-fit and predictive capability of the proposed model. Experimental results justify the fact that the model proposed herein can estimate the required information better than the existing VDMs.
2019-02-08
Katt, Basel, Prasher, Nishu.  2018.  Quantitative Security Assurance Metrics: REST API Case Studies. Proceedings of the 12th European Conference on Software Architecture: Companion Proceedings. :59:1-59:7.

Security assurance is the confidence that a system meets its security requirements based on specific evidences that an assurance technique provide. The notion of measuring security is complex and tricky. Existing approaches either (1) consider one aspect of assurance, like security requirements fulfillment, or threat/vulnerability existence, or (2) do not consider the relevance of the different security requirements to the evaluated application context. Furthermore, they are mostly qualitative in nature and are heavily based on manual processing, which make them costly and time consuming. Therefore, they are not widely used and applied, especially by small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), which constitute the backbone of the Norwegian economy. In this paper, we propose a quantification method that aims at evaluating security assurance of systems by measuring (1) the level of confidence that the mechanisms fulfilling security requirements are present and (2) the vulnerabilities associated with possible security threats are absent. Additionally, an assurance evaluation process is proposed. Two case studies applying our method are presented. The case studies use our assurance method to evaluate the security level of two REST APIs developed by Statistics Norway, where one of the authors is employed. Analysis shows that the API with the most security mechanisms implemented got a slightly higher security assurance score. Security requirement relevance and vulnerability impact played a role in the overall scores.