Biblio
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are an essential cog of the network security suite that can defend the network from malicious intrusions and anomalous traffic. Many machine learning (ML)-based IDSs have been proposed in the literature for the detection of malicious network traffic. However, recent works have shown that ML models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations through which an adversary can cause IDSs to malfunction by introducing a small impracticable perturbation in the network traffic. In this paper, we propose an adversarial ML attack using generative adversarial networks (GANs) that can successfully evade an ML-based IDS. We also show that GANs can be used to inoculate the IDS and make it more robust to adversarial perturbations.
Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet, which began as a research experiment, was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited abstractions and modularity, particularly for the control and management planes, thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at formal verification and to an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of clean slate Internet design-in particular, the software defined networking (SDN) paradigm-offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in formal methods and present a survey of its applications to networking.