Biblio
The Department of Homeland Security Cyber Security Division (CSD) chose Moving Target Defense as one of the fourteen primary Technical Topic Areas pertinent to securing federal networks and the larger Internet. Moving Target Defense over IPv6 (MT6D) employs an obscuration technique offering keyed access to hosts at a network level without altering existing network infrastructure. This is accomplished through cryptographic dynamic addressing, whereby a new network address is bound to an interface every few seconds in a coordinated manner. The goal of this research is to produce a Register Transfer Level (RTL) network security processor implementation to enable the production of an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) variant of MT6D processor for wide deployment. RTL development is challenging in that it must provide system level functions that are normally provided by the Operating System's kernel and supported libraries. This paper presents the architectural design of a hardware engine for MT6D (HE-MT6D) and is complete in simulation. Unique contributions are an inline stream-based network packet processor with a Complex Instruction Set Computer (CISC) architecture, Network Time Protocol listener, and theoretical increased performance over previous software implementations.
As the use of low-power and low resource embedded devices continues to increase dramatically with the introduction of new Internet of Things (IoT) devices, security techniques are necessary which are compatible with these devices. This research advances the knowledge in the area of cyber security for the IoT through the exploration of a moving target defense to apply for limiting the time attackers may conduct reconnaissance on embedded systems while considering the challenges presented from IoT devices such as resource and performance constraints. We introduce the design and optimizations for a Micro-Moving Target IPv6 Defense including a description of the modes of operation, needed protocols, and use of lightweight hash algorithms. We also detail the testing and validation possibilities including a Cooja simulation configuration, and describe the direction to further enhance and validate the security technique through large scale simulations and hardware testing followed by providing information on other future considerations.
Moving target defense is an area of network security research in which machines are moved logically around a network in order to avoid detection. This is done by leveraging the immense size of the IPv6 address space and the statistical improbability of two machines selecting the same IPv6 address. This defensive technique forces a malicious actor to focus on the reconnaissance phase of their attack rather than focusing only on finding holes in a machine's static defenses. We have a current implementation of an IPv6 moving target defense entitled MT6D, which works well although is limited to functioning in a peer to peer scenario. As we push our research forward into client server networks, we must discover what the limits are in reference to the client server ratio. In our current implementation of a simple UDP echo server that binds large numbers of IPv6 addresses to the ethernet interface, we discover limits in both the number of addresses that we can successfully bind to an interface and the speed at which UDP requests can be successfully handled across a large number of bound interfaces.