Biblio
Numerous antenna design approaches for wearable applications have been investigated in the literature. As on-body wearable communications become more ingrained in our daily activities, the necessity to investigate the impacts of these networks burgeons as a major requirement. In this study, we investigate the human electromagnetic field (EMF) exposure effect from on-body wearable devices at 2.4 GHz and 60 GHz, and compare the results to illustrate how the technology evolution to higher frequencies from wearable communications can impact our health. Our results suggest the average specific absorption rate (SAR) at 60 GHz can exceed the regulatory guidelines within a certain separation distance between a wearable device and the human skin surface. To the best of authors' knowledge, this is the first work that explicitly compares the human EMF exposure at different operating frequencies for on-body wearable communications, which provides a direct roadmap in design of wearable devices to be deployed in the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT).
The security of current key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the hardness of number theoretic problems. However, these key exchange protocols are threatened by weak random number generators, advances to CPU power, a new attack from the eavesdropper, and the emergence of a quantum computer. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by using quantum properties to exchange a secret key without the risk of being intercepted. Recent developments on the QKD system resulted in a stable key generation with fewer errors so that the QKD system is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. However, although the security of the QKD system is guaranteed by quantum physics, its careless implementation could make the system vulnerable. In this paper, we proposed the first side-channel attack on plug-and-play QKD system. Through a single electromagnetic trace obtained from the phase modulator on Alice's side, we were able to classify the electromagnetic trace into four classes, which corresponds to the number of bit and basis combination in the BB84 protocol. We concluded that the plug-and-play QKD system is vulnerable to side-channel attack so that the countermeasure must be considered.