Biblio

Space systems provide many critical functions to the military, federal agencies, and infrastructure networks. Nation-state adversaries have shown the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure through cyber-attacks targeting systems of networked, embedded computers. Moving target defenses (MTDs) have been proposed as a means for defending various networks and systems against potential cyber-attacks. MTDs differ from many cyber resilience technologies in that they do not necessarily require detection of an attack to mitigate the threat. We devised a MTD algorithm and tested its application to a real-time network. We demonstrated MTD usage with a real-time protocol given constraints not typically found in best-effort networks. Second, we quantified the cyber resilience benefit of MTD given an exfiltration attack by an adversary. For our experiment, we employed MTD which resulted in a reduction of adversarial knowledge by 97%. Even when the adversary can detect when the address changes, there is still a reduction in adversarial knowledge when compared to static addressing schemes. Furthermore, we analyzed the core performance of the algorithm and characterized its unpredictability using nine different statistical metrics. The characterization highlighted the algorithm has good unpredictability characteristics with some opportunity for improvement to produce more randomness.