Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Dong, Xinshu  [Clear All Filters]
2018-02-06
Chen, Binbin, Dong, Xinshu, Bai, Guangdong, Jauhar, Sumeet, Cheng, Yueqiang.  2017.  Secure and Efficient Software-Based Attestation for Industrial Control Devices with ARM Processors. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. :425–436.

For industrial control systems, ensuring the software integrity of their devices is a key security requirement. A pure software-based attestation solution is highly desirable for protecting legacy field devices that lack hardware root of trust (e.g., Trusted Platform Module). However, for the large population of field devices with ARM processors, existing software-based attestation schemes either incur long attestation time or are insecure. In this paper, we design a novel memory stride technique that significantly reduces the attestation time while remaining secure against known attacks and their advanced variants on ARM platform. We analyze the scheme's security and performance based on the formal framework proposed by Armknecht et al. [7] (with a necessary change to ensure its applicability in practical settings). We also implement memory stride on two models of real-world power grid devices that are widely deployed today, and demonstrate its superior performance.

2017-03-29
Ghosh, Uttam, Dong, Xinshu, Tan, Rui, Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew, Yau, David K.Y., Iyer, Ravishankar K..  2016.  A Simulation Study on Smart Grid Resilience Under Software-Defined Networking Controller Failures. Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM International Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security. :52–58.

Riding on the success of SDN for enterprise and data center networks, recently researchers have shown much interest in applying SDN for critical infrastructures. A key concern, however, is the vulnerability of the SDN controller as a single point of failure. In this paper, we develop a cyber-physical simulation platform that interconnects Mininet (an SDN emulator), hardware SDN switches, and PowerWorld (a high-fidelity, industry-strength power grid simulator). We report initial experiments on how a number of representative controller faults may impact the delay of smart grid communications. We further evaluate how this delay may affect the performance of the underlying physical system, namely automatic gain control (AGC) as a fundamental closed-loop control that regulates the grid frequency to a critical nominal value. Our results show that when the fault-induced delay reaches seconds (e.g., more than four seconds in some of our experiments), degradation of the AGC becomes evident. Particularly, the AGC is most vulnerable when it is in a transient following say step changes in loading, because the significant state fluctuations will exacerbate the effects of using a stale system state in the control.