Biblio
Building memory protection mechanisms into embedded hardware is attractive because it has the potential to neutralize a host of software-based attacks with relatively small performance overhead. A hardware monitor, being at the lowest level of the system stack, is more difficult to bypass than a software monitor and hardware-based protections are also potentially more fine-grained than is possible in software: an individual instruction executing on a processor may entail multiple memory accesses, all of which may be tracked in hardware. Finally, hardware-based protection can be performed without the necessity of altering application binaries. This article presents a proof-of-concept codesign of a small embedded processor with a hardware monitor protecting against ROP-style code reuse attacks. While the case study is small, it indicates, we argue, an approach to rapid-prototyping runtime monitors in hardware that is quick, flexible, and extensible as well as being amenable to formal verification.
The globalization and outsourcing of the semiconductor industry has raised serious concerns about the trustworthiness of the hardware. Importing Third Party IP cores in the Integrated Chip design has opened gates for new form of attacks on hardware. Hardware Trojans embedded in Third Party IPs has necessitated the need for secure IC design process. Design-for-Trust techniques aimed at detection of Hardware Trojans come with overhead in terms of area, latency and power consumption. In this work, we present a Cuckoo Search algorithm based Design Space Exploration process for finding low cost hardware solutions during High Level Synthesis. The exploration is conducted with respect to datapath resource allocation for single and nested loops. The proposed algorithm is compared with existing Hardware Trojan detection mechanisms and experimental results show that the proposed algorithm is able to achieve 3x improvement in Cost when compared existing algorithms.
This paper describes the work done to design a SoC platform for real-time on-line pattern search in TCP packets for Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) applications. The platform is based on a Xilinx Zynq programmable SoC and includes an accelerator that implements a pattern search engine that extends the original Boyer-Moore algorithm with timing and logical rules, that produces a very complex set of rules. Also, the platform implements different modes of operation, including SIMD and MISD parallelism, which can be configured on-line. The platform is scalable depending of the analysis requirement up to 8 Gbps. High-Level synthesis and platform based design methodologies have been used to reduce the time to market of the completed system.
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) are becoming a part of our everyday life with a wide range of applications such as labeling products and supply chain management and etc. These smart and tiny devices have extremely constrained resources in terms of area, computational abilities, memory, and power. At the same time, security and privacy issues remain as an important problem, thus with the large deployment of low resource devices, increasing need to provide security and privacy among such devices, has arisen. Resource-efficient cryptographic incipient become basic for realizing both security and efficiency in constrained environments and embedded systems like RFID tags and sensor nodes. Among those primitives, lightweight block cipher plays a significant role as a building block for security systems. In 2014 Manoj Kumar et al proposed a new Lightweight block cipher named as FeW, which are suitable for extremely constrained environments and embedded systems. In this paper, we simulate and synthesize the FeW block cipher. Implementation results of the FeW cryptography algorithm on a FPGA are presented. The design target is efficiency of area and cost.
Formal techniques provide exhaustive design verification, but computational margins have an important negative impact on its efficiency. Sequential equivalence checking is an effective approach, but traditionally it has been only applied between circuit descriptions with one-to-one correspondence for states. Applying it between RTL descriptions and high-level reference models requires removing signals, variables and states exclusive of the RTL description so as to comply with the state correspondence restriction. In this paper, we extend a previous formal methodology for RTL verification with high-level models, to check also the signals and protocol implemented in the RTL design. This protocol implementation is compared formally to a description captured from the specification. Thus, we can prove thoroughly the sequential behavior of a design under verification.