Biblio
We consider different models of malicious multiple access channels, especially for binary adder channel and for A-channel, and show how they can be used for the reformulation of digital fingerprinting coding problems. In particular, we propose a new model of multimedia fingerprinting coding. In the new model, not only zeroes and plus/minus ones but arbitrary coefficients of linear combinations of noise-like signals for forming watermarks (digital fingerprints) can be used. This modification allows dramatically increase the possible number of users with the property that if t or less malicious users create a forge digital fingerprint then a dealer of the system can find all of them with zero-error probability. We show how arisen problems are related to the compressed sensing problem.
Air-gapped networks achieve security by using the physical isolation to keep the computers and network from the Internet. However, magnetic covert channels based on CPU utilization have been proposed to help secret data to escape the Faraday-cage and the air-gap. Despite the success of such cover channels, they suffer from the high risk of being detected by the transmitter computer and the challenge of installing malware into such a computer. In this paper, we propose MagView, a distributed magnetic cover channel, where sensitive information is embedded in other data such as video and can be transmitted over the air-gapped internal network. When any computer uses the data such as playing the video, the sensitive information will leak through the magnetic covert channel. The "separation" of information embedding and leaking, combined with the fact that the covert channel can be created on any computer, overcomes these limitations. We demonstrate that CPU utilization for video decoding can be effectively controlled by changing the video frame type and reducing the quantization parameter without video quality degradation. We prototype MagView and achieve up to 8.9 bps throughput with BER as low as 0.0057. Experiments under different environment are conducted to show the robustness of MagView. Limitations and possible countermeasures are also discussed.
Wireless technology has seen a tremendous growth in the recent past. Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) modulation scheme has been utilized in almost all the advanced wireless techniques because of the advantages it offers. Hence in this aspect, SystemVue based OFDM transceiver has been developed with AWGN as the channel noise. To mitigate the channel noise Convolutional code with Viterbi decoder has been depicted. Further to protect the information from the malicious users the data is scrambled with the aid of gold codes. The performance of the transceiver is analysed through various Bit Error Rate (BER) versus Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) graphs.
With an increasing number of wireless devices, the risk of being eavesdropped increases as well. From information theory, it is well known that wiretap codes can asymptotically achieve vanishing decoding error probability at the legitimate receiver while also achieving vanishing leakage to eavesdroppers. However, under finite blocklength, there exists a tradeoff among different parameters of the transmission. In this work, we propose a flexible wiretap code design for Gaussian wiretap channels under finite blocklength by neural network autoencoders. We show that the proposed scheme has higher flexibility in terms of the error rate and leakage tradeoff, compared to the traditional codes.
The rate at which a secure key can be generated in a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is limited by the channel loss and the quantum bit-error rate (QBER). Increases to the QBER can stem from detector noise, channel noise, or the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Eve is capable of obtaining information of the unsecure key by performing an attack on the quantum channel or by listening to all discussion performed via a noiseless public channel. Conventionally a QKD protocol will perform the information reconciliation over the authenticated public channel, revealing the parity bits used to correct for any quantum bit errors. In this invited paper, the possibility of limiting the information revealed to Eve during the information reconciliation is considered. Using a covert communication channel for the transmission of the parity bits, secure key rates are possible at much higher QBERs. This is demonstrated through the simulation of a polarization based QKD system implementing the BB84 protocol, showing significant improvement of the SKRs over the conventional QKD protocols.
In this paper, we outline a novel, forward error correction-based information hiding technique for adaptive rate wireless communication systems. Specifically, we propose leveraging the functionality of wireless local area network modulation and coding schemes (MCS) and link adaptation mechanisms to significantly increase covert channel throughput. After describing our generalized information hiding model, we detail implementation of this technique within the IEEE 802.11ad, directional multi-Gigabit standard. Simulation results demonstrate the potential of the proposed techniques to develop reliable, high-throughput covert channels under multiple MCS rates and embedding techniques. Covert channel performance is evaluated in terms of the observed packet error ratio of the underlying communication system as well as the bit error ratio of the hidden data.
We demonstrate secure fiber-optic transmission utilizing quantum-noise signal masking by 217-level random phase modulation. Masking of 157 signal phase levels at a BER of HD-FEC threshold is achieved without significant impacts on the transmission performance.
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are state-of-the-art communication environments that offer various applications with distinct requirements. However, security in CPS is a nonnegotiable concept, since without a proper security mechanism the applications of CPS may risk human lives, the privacy of individuals, and system operations. In this paper, we focus on PHY-layer security approaches in CPS to prevent passive eavesdropping attacks, and we propose an integration of physical layer operations to enhance security. Thanks to the McEliece cryptosystem, error injection is firstly applied to information bits, which are encoded with the forward error correction (FEC) schemes. Golay and Hamming codes are selected as FEC schemes to satisfy power and computational efficiency. Then obtained codewords are transmitted across reliable intermediate relays to the legitimate receiver. As a performance metric, the decoding frame error rate of the eavesdropper is analytically obtained for the fragmentary existence of significant noise between relays and Eve. The simulation results validate the analytical calculations, and the obtained results show that the number of low-quality channels and the selected FEC scheme affects the performance of the proposed model.