Biblio

This publication presents some techniques for insider threats and cryptographic protocols in secure processes. Those processes are dedicated to the information management of strategic data splitting. Strategic data splitting is dedicated to enterprise management processes as well as methods of securely storing and managing this type of data. Because usually strategic data are not enough secure and resistant for unauthorized leakage, we propose a new protocol that allows to protect data in different management structures. The presented data splitting techniques will concern cryptographic information splitting algorithms, as well as data sharing algorithms making use of cognitive data analysis techniques. The insider threats techniques will concern data reconstruction methods and cognitive data analysis techniques. Systems for the semantic analysis and secure information management will be used to conceal strategic information about the condition of the enterprise. Using the new approach, which is based on cognitive systems allow to guarantee the secure features and make the management processes more efficient.

Insider threats can cause immense damage to organizations of different types, including government, corporate, and non-profit organizations. Being an insider, however, does not necessarily equate to being a threat. Effectively identifying valid threats, and assessing the type of threat an insider presents, remain difficult challenges. In this work, we propose a novel breakdown of eight insider threat types, identified by using three insider traits: predictability, susceptibility, and awareness. In addition to presenting this framework for insider threat types, we implement a computational model to demonstrate the viability of our framework with synthetic scenarios devised after reviewing real world insider threat case studies. The results yield useful insights into how further investigation might proceed to reveal how best to gauge predictability, susceptibility, and awareness, and precisely how they relate to the eight insider types.

Organizations are experiencing an ever-growing concern of how to identify and defend against insider threats. Those who have authorized access to sensitive organizational data are placed in a position of power that could well be abused and could cause significant damage to an organization. This could range from financial theft and intellectual property theft to the destruction of property and business reputation. Traditional intrusion detection systems are neither designed nor capable of identifying those who act maliciously within an organization. In this paper, we describe an automated system that is capable of detecting insider threats within an organization. We define a tree-structure profiling approach that incorporates the details of activities conducted by each user and each job role and then use this to obtain a consistent representation of features that provide a rich description of the user's behavior. Deviation can be assessed based on the amount of variance that each user exhibits across multiple attributes, compared against their peers. We have performed experimentation using ten synthetic data-driven scenarios and found that the system can identify anomalous behavior that may be indicative of a potential threat. We also show how our detection system can be combined with visual analytics tools to support further investigation by an analyst.

Existing access control mechanisms are based on the concept of identity enrolment and recognition and assume that recognized identity is a synonym to ethical actions, yet statistics over the years show that the most severe security breaches are the results of trusted, identified, and legitimate users who turned into malicious insiders. Insider threat damages vary from intellectual property loss and fraud to information technology sabotage. As insider threat incidents evolve, there exist demands for a nonidentity-based authentication measure that rejects access to authorized individuals who have mal-intents of access. In this paper, we study the possibility of using the user's intention as an access control measure using the involuntary electroencephalogram reactions toward visual stimuli. We propose intent-based access control (IBAC) that detects the intentions of access based on the existence of knowledge about an intention. IBAC takes advantage of the robustness of the concealed information test to assess access risk. We use the intent and intent motivation level to compute the access risk. Based on the calculated risk and risk accepted threshold, the system makes the decision whether to grant or deny access requests. We assessed the model using experiments on 30 participants that proved the robustness of the proposed solution.

As increasingly more enterprises are deploying cloud file-sharing services, this adds a new channel for potential insider threats to company data and IPs. In this paper, we introduce a two-stage machine learning system to detect anomalies. In the first stage, we project the access logs of cloud file-sharing services onto relationship graphs and use three complementary graph-based unsupervised learning methods: OddBall, PageRank and Local Outlier Factor (LOF) to generate outlier indicators. In the second stage, we ensemble the outlier indicators and introduce the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) method, and propose a procedure to use wavelet coefficients with the Haar wavelet function to identify outliers for insider threat. The proposed system has been deployed in a real business environment, and demonstrated effectiveness by selected case studies.

While most organizations continue to invest in traditional network defences, a formidable security challenge has been brewing within their own boundaries. Malicious insiders with privileged access in the guise of a trusted source have carried out many attacks causing far reaching damage to financial stability, national security and brand reputation for both public and private sector organizations. Growing exposure and impact of the whistleblower community and concerns about job security with changing organizational dynamics has further aggravated this situation. The unpredictability of malicious attackers, as well as the complexity of malicious actions, necessitates the careful analysis of network, system and user parameters correlated with insider threat problem. Thus it creates a high dimensional, heterogeneous data analysis problem in isolating suspicious users. This research work proposes an insider threat detection framework, which utilizes the attributed graph clustering techniques and outlier ranking mechanism for enterprise users. Empirical results also confirm the effectiveness of the method by achieving the best area under curve value of 0.7648 for the receiver operating characteristic curve.

The survey of related works on insider information security (IS) threats is presented. Special attention is paid to works that consider the insiders' behavioral models as it is very up-to-date for behavioral intrusion detection. Three key research directions are defined: 1) the problem analysis in general, including the development of taxonomy for insiders, attacks and countermeasures; 2) study of a specific IS threat with forecasting model development; 3) early detection of a potential insider. The models for the second and third directions are analyzed in detail. Among the second group the works on three IS threats are examined, namely insider espionage, cyber sabotage and unintentional internal IS violation. Discussion and a few directions for the future research conclude the paper.

Insider threat is a significant security risk for information system, and detection of insider threat is a major concern for information system organizers. Recently existing work mainly focused on the single pattern analysis of user single-domain behavior, which were not suitable for user behavior pattern analysis in multi-domain scenarios. However, the fusion of multi-domain irrelevant features may hide the existence of anomalies. Previous feature learning methods have relatively a large proportion of information loss in feature extraction. Therefore, this paper proposes a hybrid model based on the deep belief network (DBN) to detect insider threat. First, an unsupervised DBN is used to extract hidden features from the multi-domain feature extracted by the audit logs. Secondly, a One-Class SVM (OCSVM) is trained from the features learned by the DBN. The experimental results on the CERT dataset demonstrate that the DBN can be used to identify the insider threat events and it provides a new idea to feature processing for the insider threat detection.

The threat from insiders is an ever-growing concern for organisations, and in recent years the harm that insiders pose has been widely demonstrated. This paper describes our recent work into how we might support insider threat detection when actions are taken which can be immediately determined as of concern because they fall into one of two categories: they violate a policy which is specifically crafted to describe behaviours that are highly likely to be of concern if they are exhibited, or they exhibit behaviours which follow a pattern of a known insider threat attack. In particular, we view these concerning actions as something that we can design and implement tripwires within a system to detect. We then orchestrate these tripwires in conjunction with an anomaly detection system and present an approach to formalising tripwires of both categories. Our intention being that by having a single framework for describing them, alongside a library of existing tripwires in use, we can provide the community of practitioners and researchers with the basis to document and evolve this common understanding of tripwires.

Most insider attacks done by people who have the knowledge and technical know-how of launching such attacks. This topic has long been studied and many detection techniques were proposed to deal with insider threats. This short paper summarized and classified insider threat detection techniques based on strategies used for detection.

Friends, family and colleagues at work may repeatedly observe how their peers unlock their smartphones. These "insiders" may combine multiple partial observations to form a hypothesis of a target's secret. This changing landscape requires that we update the methods used to assess the security of unlocking mechanisms against human shoulder surfing attacks. In our paper, we introduce a methodology to study shoulder surfing risks in the insider threat model. Our methodology dissects the authentication process into minimal observations by humans. Further processing is based on simulations. The outcome is an estimate of the number of observations needed to break a mechanism. The flexibility of this approach benefits the design of new mechanisms. We demonstrate the application of our methodology by performing an analysis of the SwiPIN scheme published at CHI 2015. Our results indicate that SwiPIN can be defeated reliably by a majority of the population with as few as 6 to 11 observations.

System administrators have unlimited access to system resources. As the Snowden case shows, these permissions can be exploited to steal valuable personal, classified, or commercial data. In this work we propose a strategy that increases the organizational information security by constraining IT personnel's view of the system and monitoring their actions. To this end, we introduce the abstraction of perforated containers – while regular Linux containers are too restrictive to be used by system administrators, by "punching holes" in them, we strike a balance between information security and required administrative needs. Our system predicts which system resources should be accessible for handling each IT issue, creates a perforated container with the corresponding isolation, and deploys it in the corresponding machines as needed for fixing the problem. Under this approach, the system administrator retains his superuser privileges, while he can only operate within the container limits. We further provide means for the administrator to bypass the isolation, and perform operations beyond her boundaries. However, such operations are monitored and logged for later analysis and anomaly detection. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation of our strategy, along with a case study on the IT database of IBM Research in Israel.

Advanced persistent threat (APT) is becoming a major threat to cyber security. As APT attacks are often launched by well funded entities that are persistent and stealthy in achieving their goals, they are highly challenging to combat in a cost-effective way. The situation becomes even worse when a sophisticated attacker is further assisted by an insider with privileged access to the inside information. Although stealthy attacks and insider threats have been considered separately in previous works, the coupling of the two is not well understood. As both types of threats are incentive driven, game theory provides a proper tool to understand the fundamental tradeoffs involved. In this paper, we propose the first three-player attacker-defender-insider game to model the strategic interactions among the three parties. Our game extends the two-player FlipIt game model for stealthy takeover by introducing an insider that can trade information to the attacker for a profit. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the game with the defender as the leader and the attacker and the insider as the followers, under two different information trading processes. We make various observations and discuss approaches for achieving more efficient defense in the face of both APT and insider threats.