Biblio

In the Bitcoin mining network, miners contribute computation power to solve crypto-puzzles in exchange for financial rewards. Due to the randomness and the competitiveness of mining, individual miners tend to join mining pools for low risks and steady incomes. Usually, a pool is managed by its central operator, who charges fees for providing risk-sharing services. This paper presents a hierarchical distributed computation paradigm where miners can distribute their power among multiple pools. By adding virtual pools, we separate miners’ dual roles of being the operator as well as being the member when solo mining. We formulate a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game to study the joint utility maximization of pool operators and miners, thereby addressing a computation power allocation problem. We investigate two practical pool operation modes, a uniform-share-difficulty mode and a nonuniform-share-difficulty mode. We derive analytical results for the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game under both modes, based on which optimal strategies are designed for all operators and miners. Numerical evaluations are presented to verify the proposed model.

Increasing number of Internet-scale applications, such as video streaming, incur huge amount of wide area traffic. Such traffic over the unreliable Internet without bandwidth guarantee suffers unpredictable network performance. This result, however, is unappealing to the application providers. Fortunately, Internet giants like Google and Microsoft are increasingly deploying their private wide area networks (WANs) to connect their global datacenters. Such high-speed private WANs are reliable, and can provide predictable network performance. In this paper, we propose a new type of service-inter-datacenter network as a service (iDaaS), where traditional application providers can reserve bandwidth from those Internet giants to guarantee their wide area traffic. Specifically, we design a bandwidth trading market among multiple iDaaS providers and application providers, and concentrate on the essential bandwidth pricing problem. The involved challenging issue is that the bandwidth price of each iDaaS provider is not only influenced by other iDaaS providers, but also affected by the application providers. To address this issue, we characterize the interaction between iDaaS providers and application providers using a Stackelberg game model, and analyze the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We further present an efficient bandwidth pricing algorithm by blending the advantage of a geometrical Nash bargaining solution and the demand segmentation method. For comparison, we present two bandwidth reservation algorithms, where each iDaaS provider's bandwidth is reserved in a weighted fair manner and a max-min fair manner, respectively. Finally, we conduct comprehensive trace-driven experiments. The evaluation results show that our proposed algorithms not only ensure the revenue of iDaaS providers, but also provide bandwidth guarantee for application providers with lower bandwidth price per unit.

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and exploit information asymmetry for defenders. In this paper, we study a scenario in which a powerful defender uses honeynets for active defense in order to observe an attacker who has penetrated the network. Rather than immediately eject the attacker, the defender may elect to gather information. We introduce an undiscounted, infinite-horizon Markov decision process on a continuous state space in order to model the defender's problem. We find a threshold of information that the defender should gather about the attacker before ejecting him. Then we study the robustness of this policy using a Stackelberg game. Finally, we simulate the policy for a conceptual network. Our results provide a quantitative foundation for studying optimal timing for attacker engagement in network defense.

We consider a generic model of Client-Server interactions in the presence of Sender and Relay, conceptual agents acting on behalf of Client and Server, respectively, and modeling cloud service providers in the envisaged "QoS as a Service paradigm". Client generates objects which Sender tags with demanded QoS level, whereas Relay assigns the QoS level to be provided at Server. To verify an object's right to a QoS level, Relay detects its signature that neither Client nor Sender can modify. Since signature detection is costly, Relay tends to occasionally skip it and trust an object; this prompts Sender to occasionally launch a Fake VIP attack, i.e., demand undue QoS level. In a Stackelberg game setting, Relay employs a trust strategy in the form of a double-blind reputation scheme so as to minimize the signature detection cost and undue QoS provision, anticipating a best-response Fake VIP attack strategy on the part of Sender. We ask whether the double-blind reputation scheme, previously proved resilient to a probabilistic Fake VIP attack strategy, is equally resilient to more intelligent Sender behavior. Two intelligent attack strategies are proposed and analyzed using two-dimensional Markov chains.

With the capability of support mobile computing demand with small delay, fog computing has gained tremendous popularity. Nevertheless, its highly virtualized environment is vulnerable to cyber attacks such as emerging Advanced Persistent Threats attack. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for the fog computing platform. Particularly, we adopt the cyber-insurance as a tool for neutralizing cyber risks from fog computing platform. We consider a fog computing platform containing a group of fog nodes. The platform is composed of three main entities, i.e., the fog computing provider, attacker, and cyber-insurer. The fog computing provider dynamically optimizes the allocation of its defense computing resources to improve the security of the fog computing platform. Meanwhile, the attacker dynamically adjusts the allocation of its attack resources to improve the probability of successful attack. Additionally, to prevent from the potential loss due to attacks, the provider also makes a dynamic decision on the purchases ratio of cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer for each fog node. Thereafter, the cyber-insurer accordingly determines the premium of cyber-insurance for each fog node. In our formulated dynamic Stackelberg game, the attacker and provider act as the followers, and the cyber-insurer acts as the leader. In the lower level, we formulate an evolutionary subgame to analyze the provider's defense and cyber-insurance subscription strategies as well as the attacker's attack strategy. In the upper level, the cyber-insurer optimizes its premium determination strategy, taking into account the evolutionary equilibrium at the lower-level evolutionary subgame. We analytically prove that the evolutionary equilibrium is unique and stable. Moreover, we provide a series of insightful analytical and numerical results on the equilibrium of the dynamic Stackelberg game.

Radio network information is leaked well beyond the perimeter in which the radio network is deployed. We investigate attacks where person location can be inferred using the radio characteristics of wireless links (e.g., the received signal strength). An attacker can deploy a network of receivers which measure the received signal strength of the radio signals transmitted by the legitimate wireless devices inside a perimeter, allowing the attacker to learn the locations of people moving in the vicinity of the devices inside the perimeter. In this paper, we develop the first solution to this location privacy problem where neither the attacker nodes nor the tracked moving object transmit any RF signals. We first model the radio network leakage attack using a Stackelberg game. Next, we define utility and cost functions related to the defender and attacker actions. Last, using our utility and cost functions, we find the optimal strategy for the defender by applying a greedy method. We evaluate our game theoretic framework using experiments and find that our approach significantly reduces the chance of an attacker determining the location of people inside a perimeter.

We study a quantity-flexibility supply contract between a manufacturer and a retailer in two periods. The retailer can get a low wholesale price within a fixed quantity and adjust the quantity at the end of the first period. The retailer can adjust the order quantities after the first period based on updated inventory status by paying a higher per-unit price for the incremental units or obtaining a buyback price per-unit for the returning units. By developing a two-period dynamic programming model in this paper, we first obtain an optimal replenishment strategy for the retailer when the manufacturer's price scheme is known. Then we derive an proper pricing scheme for the manufacturer by assuming that the supply chain is coordinated. The numerical results show some managerial insights by comparing this coordination scheme with Stackelberg game.