Biblio

In this article, we introduce the MACH-2K trust overlay network and its architecture. MACH-2K's objectives are to (a) enhance the resiliency of emergency response and public service networks and (b) help build such networks in places, or at times, where network infrastructure is limited. Resiliency may be enhanced in an economic manner by building new ad hoc networks of private mobile devices and joining these to public service networks at specific trusted points. The major barrier to building resiliency by using private devices is ensuring security. MACH-2K uses device location and communication utility patterns to assign trust to devices, after owner approval. After trust is established, message confidentiality, privacy, and integrity may be implemented by well-known cryptographic means. MACH-2K devices may be then requested to forward or consume different types of messages depending on their current level of trust and utility.

Crowd sensing is one of the core features of internet of vehicles, the use of internet of vehicles for crowd sensing is conducive to the rational allocation of sensing tasks. This paper mainly studies the problem of task allocation for crowd sensing in internet of vehicles, proposes a trajectory-based task allocation scheme for crowd sensing in internet of vehicles. With limited budget constraints, participants' trajectory is taken as an indicator of the spatiotemporal availability. Based on the solution idea of the minimal-cover problem, select the minimum number of participating vehicles to achieve the coverage of the target area.

With the rapid development of the contemporary society, wide use of smart phone and vehicle sensing devices brings a huge influence on the extensive data collection. Network coding can only provide weak security privacy protection. Aiming at weak secure feature of network coding, this paper proposes an information transfer mechanism, Weak Security Network Coding with Homomorphic Encryption (HE-WSNC), and it is integrated into routing policy. In this mechanism, a movement model is designed, which allows information transmission process under Wi-Fi and Bluetooth environment rather than consuming 4G data flow. Not only does this application reduce the cost, but also improve reliability of data transmission. Moreover, it attracts more users to participate.

We develop an auction framework for privacy-preserving data aggregation in mobile crowdsensing, where the platform plays the role as an auctioneer to recruit workers for a sensing task. In this framework, the workers are allowed to report privacy-preserving versions of their data to protect their data privacy; and the platform selects workers based on their sensing capabilities, which aims to address the drawbacks of game-theoretic models that cannot ensure the accuracy level of the aggregated result, due to the existence of multiple Nash Equilibria. Observe that in this auction based framework, there exists externalities among workers' data privacy, because the data privacy of each worker depends on both her injected noise and the total noise in the aggregated result that is intimately related to which workers are selected to fulfill the task. To achieve a desirable accuracy level of the data aggregation in a cost-effective manner, we explicitly characterize the externalities, i.e., the impact of the noise added by each worker on both the data privacy and the accuracy of the aggregated result. Further, we explore the problem structure, characterize the hidden monotonicity property of the problem, and determine the critical bid of workers, which makes it possible to design a truthful, individually rational and computationally efficient incentive mechanism. The proposed incentive mechanism can recruit a set of workers to approximately minimize the cost of purchasing private sensing data from workers subject to the accuracy requirement of the aggregated result. We validate the proposed scheme through theoretical analysis as well as extensive simulations.

The recent proliferation of human-carried mobile devices has given rise to mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that outsource the collection of sensory data to the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices. A fundamental issue in such systems is to effectively incentivize worker participation. However, instead of being an isolated module, the incentive mechanism usually interacts with other components which may affect its performance, such as data aggregation component that aggregates workers' data and data perturbation component that protects workers' privacy. Therefore, different from past literature, we capture such interactive effect, and propose INCEPTION, a novel MCS system framework that integrates an incentive, a data aggregation, and a data perturbation mechanism. Specifically, its incentive mechanism selects workers who are more likely to provide reliable data, and compensates their costs for both sensing and privacy leakage. Its data aggregation mechanism also incorporates workers' reliability to generate highly accurate aggregated results, and its data perturbation mechanism ensures satisfactory protection for workers' privacy and desirable accuracy for the final perturbed results. We validate the desirable properties of INCEPTION through theoretical analysis, as well as extensive simulations.