Biblio

The increasing adoption of 3D printing in many safety and mission critical applications exposes 3D printers to a variety of cyber attacks that may result in catastrophic consequences if the printing process is compromised. For example, the mechanical properties (e.g., physical strength, thermal resistance, dimensional stability) of 3D printed objects could be significantly affected and degraded if a simple printing setting is maliciously changed. To address this challenge, this study proposes a model-free real-time online process monitoring approach that is capable of detecting and defending against the cyber-physical attacks on the firmwares of 3D printers. Specifically, we explore the potential attacks and consequences of four key printing attributes (including infill path, printing speed, layer thickness, and fan speed) and then formulate the attack models. Based on the intrinsic relation between the printing attributes and the physical observations, our defense model is established by systematically analyzing the multi-faceted, real-time measurement collected from the accelerometer, magnetometer and camera. The Kalman filter and Canny filter are used to map and estimate three aforementioned critical toolpath information that might affect the printing quality. Mel-frequency Cepstrum Coefficients are used to extract features for fan speed estimation. Experimental results show that, for a complex 3D printed design, our method can achieve 4% Hausdorff distance compared with the model dimension for infill path estimate, 6.07% Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) for speed estimate, 9.57% MAPE for layer thickness estimate, and 96.8% accuracy for fan speed identification. Our study demonstrates that, this new approach can effectively defend against the cyber-physical attacks on 3D printers and 3D printing process.

Privacy issues can be difficult for end-users to understand and are therefore a key concern for information-sharing systems. This paper describes a deployment of fifteen Bluetooth-beacon-enabled 'creatures' spread across London's Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, which initiate conversations on mobile phones in their vicinity via push notifications. Playing on the common assumption that neutral public settings promote anonymity, users' willingness to converse with personified chatbots is used as a proxy for understanding their inclination to share personal and potentially disclosing information. Each creature is linked to a conversational agent that asks for users' memories and their responses are then shared with other creatures in the network. This paper presents the design of an interactive device used to test users' awareness of how their information propagates to others.

Additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, has been increasingly applied to fabricate highly intellectual property (IP) sensitive products. However, the related IP protection issues in 3D printers are still largely underexplored. On the other hand, smartphones are equipped with rich onboard sensors and have been applied to pervasive mobile surveillance in many applications. These facts raise one critical question: is it possible that smartphones access the side-channel signals of 3D printer and then hack the IP information? To answer this, we perform an end-to-end study on exploring smartphone-based side-channel attacks against 3D printers. Specifically, we formulate the problem of the IP side-channel attack in 3D printing. Then, we investigate the possible acoustic and magnetic side-channel attacks using the smartphone built-in sensors. Moreover, we explore a magnetic-enhanced side-channel attack model to accurately deduce the vital directional operations of 3D printer. Experimental results show that by exploiting the side-channel signals collected by smartphones, we can successfully reconstruct the physical prints and their G-code with Mean Tendency Error of 5.87% on regular designs and 9.67% on complex designs, respectively. Our study demonstrates this new and practical smartphone-based side channel attack on compromising IP information during 3D printing.